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I. INTRODUCTION
Is a living human embryo or fetus a "person" within the legal meaning of
the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? Put
somewhat differently, is the unborn human child-despite not yet being born-
nonetheless constitutionally a "person " whom the state may not deprive of life
"without due process of law"] and to whom the several states owe a
constitutional legal duty of "equal protection of the laws" 2 from the private
violence or wrongs of others, or the discrimination of the state?
This, I submit, is a close, difficult, and exceedingly important constitutional
question. The better answer-but by no means an incontrovertibly clear
answer-is yes. The difficulty with such an answer lies in the unclear range of
the original meaning of the word "person" as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.3
In this Article, I consider the constitutional question of the legal personhood
status of living human fetuses in utero. The question was of course resolved
against such status in the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, forty years
ago. 4 It is the correctness of that resolution that I wish to re-examine here.
I will do so from the perspective of the full range of classic types of
constitutional argument: (1) Text: What was the meaning of the word "person"
1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
2 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
3 I will typically refer simply to "the Fourteenth Amendment" as the focus of my
discussion on constitutional legal personhood, though the provisions of the Fifth
Amendment are linguistically parallel in many respects. There are key differences, which I
will discuss when relevant to the main thread of the argument. Chiefly: The Fourteenth
Amendment limits state government power and authorizes Congress to enforce its
provisions. The Fifth Amendment limits national government power. In addition, the Fifth
Amendment has no "equal protection of the laws" guarantee, though such a requirement has
(rightly or wrongly) been found implicit in the Fifth Amendment's other textual provisions.
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Both amendments forbid government
action-and possibly forbid government inaction-that deprives a "person" of "life, liberty,
or property" without "due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
4410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (concluding that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn").
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in public and legal discourse in America at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment (and, before that, of the Fifth)? (2) Structure: What
light is shed on the meaning of the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment
by the logic, structure, and language of other provisions of the Constitution
(including other usage of the specific word elsewhere in the document)? What
general principles governing constitutional interpretation can be derived from
the structure and nature of the Constitution's separation of powers, and do those
principles suggest any default rules for dealing with cases of linguistic
ambiguity or indeterminacy? (3) History and Original "Intent ": What evidence
is there supporting a conclusion that unborn humans were specifically intended,
understood, or expected to be constitutionally protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment? (4) Precedent: Before Roe, what had prior judicial (and non-
judicial) interpretation suggested; and, relevant to reconsideration of Roe, what
judicial (and non-judicial) legal reasoning subsequently has supported a view of
the unborn as legal persons? (5) Policy, Pragmatics, or Evolving Meaning:
Aside from legal precedent, has there been an evolving public or scientific
conception expanding (or contracting) what it might mean to be a "person"
possessing legal rights incident to that status (and is such evolution or
devolution legitimately probative of constitutional meaning)? Do general policy
considerations, to the extent relevant to constitutional interpretation, suggest a
preference for a broad rather than a narrow conception of who counts as a
"person" or suggest a presumption in favor of resolving disputed cases in one
direction rather than another?
Before proceeding, I offer four disclaimers: First, I make no claim that my
position represents present law as understood by the Supreme Court. It
obviously does not. Roe rejects personhood for the unborn. The question I
examine is the correctness or incorrectness of this vital first premise of Roe. The
Court in Roe did, however, recognize the stakes of the issue, explicitly
conceding that if the unborn were legal persons, the Court would be required to
reach almost exactly the opposite conclusion of what it in fact held.5 Roe
created a right to abortion of living human embryos and fetuses-gestating,
growing, developing in their mothers' wombs-on the premise that such living
human beings were not, legally, "persons," and thus possessed no constitutional
rights of their own that the Court's jurisprudence need respect. But Roe granted
that, if that premise were wrong, the right to abortion that it was creating could
not legitimately exist, at least not in the full scope decreed in Roe.6 Indeed,
quite the reverse, it would appear that for government to allow abortion
5 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57 ("If this suggestion of personhood is established, the
appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed
specifically by the Amendment."). As I explain below, this concession is somewhat
overstated. Recognition that the unborn human fetus is a "person" would not resolve all
questions concerning the scope of constitutionally allowable abortion. It would meaningfully
alter the framework for consideration of such issues, of course, but there would remain many
specific issues to resolve. See infra pp. 29-30, 70-72.
6 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
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essentially as a matter of unrestricted choice-for the state to deny the equal
protection of the law from the violent acts of others to a class of legal persons
characterized by their extreme youth, dependency, and vulnerability-likely
would be affirmatively unconstitutional.7
Second, I make no claim that my position is original. The issue is as old, at
least, as the arguments in Roe. Others have asserted the position I advance here,
as a critique of Roe. But I fear that that position has not always been carefully,
or dispassionately, defended. My goal here is to present a fresh, fair, balanced,
reasonable examination of this proposition in a systematic and serious way,
making fair use of standard, widely accepted methods of constitutional analysis.
Not all arguments that have been offered in support of legal personhood in the
past can make that claim. But some of them can, at least in part, and I will draw
extensively on excellent prior work by others. Mine is not a new or novel
position.
Third, I make no claim that the legal personhood position is indisputably
correct. My proposition is rather the obverse: that the rejection of the
personhood position-a critical premise from which the abortion-rights
argument of Roe proceeds-is not indisputably correct, either. The correct
conclusion is that there is no correct conclusion to the question of the
constitutional personhood of the human fetus. Applying standard methodologies
of constitutional interpretation, the "right answer" is that the Constitution,
properly interpreted, does not supply a definitive single-right-answer answer to
this most extraordinarily important of constitutional questions. My argument is,
therefore, one for the legal plausibility of the personhood position only. I do not
want to overstate my case. Where an argument does not support the personhood
7 See generally MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, STEVEN G. CALABRESI, MICHAEL W.
MCCONNELL & SAMUEL L. BRAY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1381-82
(2010) ("Why is not the most natural reading of the Equal Protection Clause . . .addressed to
the state's affirmative duty literally to protect, on an equal basis, all persons from the private
violence or similar wrongful acts of other persons or groups? This understanding makes
sense of the historical context, in which there had been a pervasive problem of failure to
protect the newly freed blacks from discrimination and even violence."); Nelson Lund &
John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1562
n.25 (2004) ("The Equal Protection Clause, as its wording implies, was probably only meant
to require governments to protect all groups equally from having their rights violated by
other private persons. A prominent illustration of the need for this provision was the
tolerance of some governments for the activities of the Ku Klux Klan."). Withdrawal of
protection of the laws from a class of persons, essentially yielding them up to the private
wrongs or violence of others, arguably could be classified as a deprivation of life and liberty
by government, without due process, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. But cf Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)
(holding that the Due Process Clause did not apply where the police failed to enforce a
restraining order resulting in the death of petitioner's children); DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189 (1989) (syllabus) (holding that a "State's
failure to protect an individual against private violence generally does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause, because the Clause imposes no duty on the State to
provide members of the general public with adequate protective services").
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position, I will say so. Where an inference is only partially, or weakly,
supported by the evidence, I will acknowledge as such. If my conclusion thus
ends up being an uncertain-sounding one, it is because uncertainty is the correct
legal conclusion, precisely because that is where fair consideration of the
evidence leads.
That in itself may have important consequences for the legal debate over
Roe, however: Uncertainty as to the constitutional legal status of living human
fetuses may affect how reasonable judges would construct, or alter, a
constitutional "balancing" scheme (assuming one believes that to be the proper
judicial task); uncertainty may also affect how one views the division of
practical interpretive power between courts enforcing Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment's self-executing commands, and Congress in enacting
legislation pursuant to Section Five of the Amendment to enforce, or effectuate,
the commands of Section One (a point I develop at some length below);8 and as
already noted, uncertainty may defeat the argument for constitutional abortion
rights entirely, if certainty as to the legal non-personhood of the human fetus is
an essential premise of the argument for a right to abortion-as the Court in Roe
itself thought to be the case. 9
Finally, if the analysis of personhood, applying rigorous constitutional
analytic methodology, yields an uncertain conclusion-because of weaknesses
in textual, structural, historical, or precedential arguments for such a
conclusion-that in itself might be understood to function as (yet another)
strong, if indirect, critique of the interpretive methodology of Roe: If proper
constitutional analysis yields doubts about legal "personhood" for living,
unborn human children, it surely yields far more serious doubts about the
legitimacy of "substantive due process" ad hoc judicial balancing and
policymaking of the sort embodied in the Court's abortion jurisprudence as it
stands.
A fourth and final disclaimer: I am a foe of Roe. Here, as in much previous
writing, I come not to praise Roe but to bury it.10 For the fair-minded, this
8See infra pp. 39-45.
9 See supra note 4.
10 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Paulsen, J, Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID 196 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) [hereinafter Paulsen, Paulsen, J.,
Dissenting]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000) [hereinafter
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some
Variations on the Themes of Robert M Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33
(1989) [hereinafter Paulsen, Accusing Justice]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets,
and Government Lawyers: The Duty ofLoyalty and Its Limits, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
83 (1998); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 995 (2003) [hereinafter Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision]; see
also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Casey: Enduring, Entrenched, Intentionally Evil Egregious
Error, PUB. DISCOURSE (June 29, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/06/5774/;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, It's a Girl, PUB. DISCOURSE (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/10/4149/; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Planned
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nothing-up-my-sleeve concession should not disqualify my argument any more
than the pro-Roe policy predilections of most Roe defenders automatically
should disqualify theirs. In either case, the logical and legal strengths of the
arguments should be analyzed on their own terms. It is surely proper to
acknowledge one's perspective up front-so wary readers can be aware, and
beware-but it should not be essential to serious intellectual discussion of legal
arguments. The existence of a particular point of view, or even a predisposition,
with respect to a particular policy position merely takes away whatever
enhanced credibility might be thought conferred by legal analysis that argues
against one's preferred policy positions.1' Such credibility, however, is really
only a product of the ad hominem fallacy in reverse. Neither type of claim is
really sound. An argument is neither enhanced nor diminished by the
correspondence or conflict of its conclusion with its maker's politics. Analysis
stands or falls-or should-on its own merits.
This Article's roadmap is straightforward and simple. I proceed through
examination of constitutional arguments from text, structure, history, precedent,
and policy, discussing each as they concern the constitutional question of
whether the living human embryo or fetus is a "person" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. TEXT
A. The Meaning of the Word "Person"
Begin with the text. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
Parenthood v. Casey at Twenty: The Worst Constitutional Decision of all Time, PUB.
DISCOURSE (June 28, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/06/5772/; Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Unbearable Wrongness of Roe, PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4577/.
I 1See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (arguing, against personal policy views, that Roe is unsound as a
matter of constitutional law). I have a few such instances of these conflicts between policy
preferences and legal views. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate
Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 991 (2008) [hereinafter Paulsen, Government of
Adequate Powers]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its
Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 857, 916 n.179 (2009) [hereinafter Paulsen, Does
the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?] (collecting examples); see also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Power to Destroy, PUB. DISCOURSE (Aug. 8, 2012),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/08/6096 (defending the unfortunate correctness of
the Supreme Court's "Obamacare" decision, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
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laws."' 2 What is the meaning of the word "person" within this authoritative
written legal text?
The answer to any such question of constitutional textual meaning lies in
seeking the original public meaning that a word, term, or phrase would have
had, in the linguistic and cultural-political context in which it was used, to
reasonably well-informed speakers and readers of the English language at the
time. 13 With respect to the word person as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
the question to be asked is what the word would have been understood to mean,
in the context of a newly enacted constitutional provision, to informed users of
the English language, in the period of roughly 1866-1868. With respect to the
word person as used in the Fifth Amendment, the question is identical, but with
a different point in time as the focus of original meaning (1789-1791). Note
also that the meaning of the word in the Fourteenth Amendment may be
affected by its meaning in the Fifth-and even by evidence of how the term as
used in the Fifth Amendment had come to be understood at the time of
enactment of the Fourteenth, if that meaning is different from the Fifth
Amendment's original meaning.
Original public textual meaning is an inquiry distinct from the question of
what the drafters of the provision may have intended or, getting somewhat
warmer, what its ratifiers may have understood. 14 That inquiry comes later-in
Part III of this Article-and properly should have a subordinate status. 15 The
question here is not one of subjective intention or understanding but of the
objective linguistic meaning of a provision. To be sure, evidence of specific
subjective intention or, better yet, evidence of the understanding of a term by
persons employing it at the time, may supply important evidence relevant to
identifying the original public meaning of a term. The inquiries are related. For
that reason, I will make use of such evidence from the outset in discussing
textual meaning, but always with the caveat that it is evidence of original,
objective linguistic meaning in context, not the object of inquiry itself.
The objective meaning of the word person, in legal understanding, in 1860s
America (and, before that, in 1780s America), as it concerns the specific case of
conceived and living-but not yet born-human beings is, not surprisingly,
12U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. V
(similar).
13 For a systematic defense of this methodological proposition, see generally Kesavan
& Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note *. For further elaboration, and an argument that
the text of the Constitution itself specifies that this is the correct methodology for
interpretation and application of the document, see generally Paulsen, Does the Constitution
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 11. These articles, of course, draw
substantially on the work of other scholars who have explicated and defended original-
public-meaning textualism, in various forms, as the proper method for interpreting the
Constitution.
14Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note *, at 1131-33. See generally
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 11.
15 See Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note *, at 1132, 1134-48; Paulsen,
Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 11, at 873-75.
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somewhat ambiguous. The text is silent as to this specific instance or
application of the word "person." However, the word's usage in legal and
political discourse, as well as common understanding, indicates that person was
understood as synonymous with "human being" or "human." 16 One frequently
sees person used interchangeably with "man," in the non-gender-specific sense
of the word at the time.17 The word appears to have had no narrower, more
specific legal term-of-art understanding apart from such a common
understanding-though, as we shall see, it may well have had some broader
understandings when used in a specifically legal context to address the "rights
of persons."18 In the main, however, "person" was simply an ordinary and
encompassing word denoting any and all human beings.19 It was obviously
distinct from the more limited legal term "citizen." Clearly, someone could be a
"person" without being a citizen. Nor is the term "person" limited by age,
political condition, or legal status: Children, aliens, members of Indian tribes,
and slaves were all understood as "persons." 20
It thus seems a fair conclusion that the objective linguistic meaning of the
constitutional word "person," in 1791 and also in 1868, as employed in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, did not automatically exclude the unborn.
"Person" does not, as a necessary function of its determinate linguistic meaning,
exclude application to living human fetuses-human beings that are "unborn"
but already exist as living beings.
At the same time, the objective, original linguistic meaning of the word
does not clearly and unequivocally include the unborn, either. In short, the
original meaning, as applied to unborn human fetuses, is ambiguous. The
presumption might well be that a general term of inclusion should be
understood as embracing all instances fairly falling within its range of meaning
that are not by legal definition excluded: That is the approach most common to
understanding general constitutional language, under most interpretive
methodologies. 21 (The only question then becomes whether legislatures or
courts-or perhaps either or both of them-possess the authority to select the
16 NoAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 734
(Chauncey Goodrich ed., Harper & Bros. 1853) (2d ed. 1841).
17 Id
18 See infra Part II.B.
19 Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century dictionaries embrace the same broad, common
understanding of "person" as "[a]n individual human being, consisting of body and soul" or
"[a] human being considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only,"
WEBSTER, supra note 16, at 734, or an "[i]ndividual or particular man or woman" as
"opposed to things" or simply "[h]uman being" or "[a] general loose term for a human
being," 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 686 (J.E. Worcester
ed., Cottons & Barnard 1834) (3d ed. 1766) (collecting definitions drawn from Locke,
Spratt, Dryden, and Clarissa).
20 See supra note 19.
21 For the paradigmatic illustration, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819). For a general discussion of this point, see Paulsen, A Government of Adequate
Powers, supra note 11, at 994-96.
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narrower or broader reading.)22 But such a presumption remains only a
presumption. The presumption that human fetuses fall within-are not excluded
by-the linguistic meaning of the Constitution's term "person" would probably
have to give way in the face of more specific evidence of a more specific and
more limited term-of-art meaning to the word.
At this point, however, we are still looking to evidence of the objective
linguistic meaning of the text at the time its words were adopted. Evidence
concerning whether the unborn were specifically contemplated or intended to be
included by the word "person," or not so contemplated or intended, is largely
beside the point, except insofar as such evidence sheds secondary light on what
the term "person" was understood to mean in common or specialized English
linguistic usage at the time. What would count, rather, is evidence that the
public meaning of the term "person" carried with it a generally known
specialized legal usage, when employed in legal descriptions of the rights of
persons-such as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. The relevant hunt is for such evidence of public legal meaning.
B. Did the Word "Person" Have a Specific, Legal Term-of-Art Meaning
at the Time of the Adoption of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments?
Did the word "person" have a narrower-or a broader-specific legal
meaning in eighteenth and early nineteenth century usage? If one were a lawyer
or a legally minded citizen looking for specialized legal usage of the term in the
Founding and Reconstruction generations, the place to go would have been
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in the late
1760s.23 Blackstone's four-volume work was the authoritative legal text,
primer, and starting point for nearly all matters of legal usage of terms, legal
principles and their standard operation, and legal rules and presumptions. 24 This
was true in America as well as in England. The Framers had Blackstone readily
at hand and drew on its principles, whether to follow them or sometimes to
depart from them.25 Blackstone's Commentaries may thus be understood as, in
22 The classic case affirming broad legislative power to choose to act pursuant to a
broad reading of textual language, taken in its fullest sweep, is McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 323-24, 330. I develop this point infra Part III.B.
2 3 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 7-8 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION].
24 See id; Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.
551, 561 (2006).
25 See AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 7-8 (referring
to Blackstone's commentaries as "canonical" and observing that: "Both before and after
Independence, American lawyers and activists of all stripes relied heavily and preeminently
on the Commentaries for instruction on basic English legal principles, many of which
applied with full force in America. Sifting through nearly a thousand American political
tracts printed between 1760 and 1805, one scholar has found that no European authorities
were cited more frequently than Montesquieu and Blackstone, each of whom was invoked
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a sense, something of a topical concordance or glossary of the common and
specialized legal meanings of certain terms-in essence performing a dictionary
function better even than would a contemporaneous dictionary. Blackstone's
Commentaries not only defined, but also explained and applied, the legal
meanings of terms, and did so in the context of these generations' most
authoritative treatise on law in general.26 If one were looking for a technical,
specifically legal gloss on the meaning of "person," as used in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, one would read Blackstone.
And it turns out that Blackstone has a good bit to say about the legal
meaning of the term "person." Strikingly, what Blackstone has to say is fairly
significantly probative of the meaning of "person" as it applies to the question
of the status, in law, of conceived but unborn human infants. Following an
extended "Introduction" to the Commentaries concerning the study of law, the
nature of laws in general, and the extent of application of the laws of England,
Blackstone takes up immediately, in "Book I, Chapter I," the topic of "the
Rights of Persons"-and specifically, the "Absolute Rights of Individuals."2 7
"The objects of the laws of England are so very numerous and extensive, that in
order to consider them with any tolerable ease and perspicuity, it will be
necessary to distribute them methodically, under proper and distinct
heads .... "28 Those heads are, for Blackstone: the "rights of persons; . . . the
rights of things; . .. private wrongs, or civil injuries; ... public wrongs, or
crimes and misdemeanors.. . ."29
"Rights of persons" is first up, and it is in this context that Blackstone
proceeds to discuss, front and center, the legal meaning of the term "persons."30
The context is significant: Blackstone's explication of the meaning of "persons"
comes in the context of discussion of what rights they possess as persons3 1-
the same context in which the question of the legal understanding of
personhood is presented in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Are the
unborn within the range of meaning of "persons" who may not be deprived of
almost three times as often as the next man on the list, John Locke."). The work Professor
Amar cites is DONALD S. LUTZ, A PREFACE To AMERICAN POLITICAL LEGAL THEORY 134-40
(1992). An endnote to Amar's book collects myriad representative samples of prominent
founding-era documents and Framers citing Blackstone as definitive legal authority. See
AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 520 n.7.
26 Cf Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note *, at 1156-58 (making a
similar point about the interpretive weight to be accorded to The Federalist as a source for
understanding original public meaning of the Constitution's words and phrases: Quite apart
from serving as a source of evidence of the framing generation's understanding or intention,
the papers comprising The Federalist are a powerful, contemporaneous display of original
linguistic usage of terms in the especially helpful context of a comprehensive and thoughtful
discussion explaining and defending the proposed Constitution).
27 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 121 (emphasis added).28 Id
29 Id. at *122.30 Id at *123.3 1Id.
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life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and who are entitled to
receive the equal protection of the laws? Blackstone precedes his discussion of
the meaning of "persons" with a statement of the obligation of the sovereign to
protect the rights of all such persons (an idiom arguably reflected in the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause):
"Allegiance is the right of the magistrate, and protection the right of the
people." 32
Then comes the most apposite part of Blackstone's discussion, as it pertains
to the meaning the word "person" would have had in Anglo-American legal and
political discourse in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: "Persons
also are divided by the law into either natural persons or artificial. Natural
persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are
created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government,
which are called corporations or bodies politic." 33
Thus, the more specialized legal meaning of "person" was broader than the
ordinary popular meaning of the word, though it obviously embraced the
common meaning as well. It covered corporations-artificial legal persons--as
well as "natural persons." 34
32 1d. (emphasis added).
33 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 123.
34 1d. This enlarged, Blackstonian legal meaning of "person" as including corporations
has been picked up as part of the American constitutional understanding of what the term
"person," as used in the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, includes. See,
e.g., Santa Clara Cnty. v. So. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). This is noteworthy: If
the word "person" as used in the Constitution fairly can be said to incorporate widely
accepted Blackstonian definitions of the word, extending even to legal-fiction "persons," it
would seem, a fortiori, to embrace the broad Blackstonian definition of who is included
within the category of "natural persons." This is a somewhat different, and I submit more
precise, argument than the one sometimes used by advocates of the legal personhood
position with respect to abortion, which runs more along the lines of an argument from irony
or hypocrisy: If even corporations can be treated by the law as legal "persons," then surely
unborn babies should be treated as legal persons, too. The argument, so cast, has an
intuitive, rhetorical appeal. But the more precise legal argument is that for the same
interpretive methodological reason that corporations properly can be understood as legal
persons-that that was conventional term-of-art legal usage, and thus bears heavily on what
the legal meaning of the term "person" was at the time the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments were adopted-natural persons, entitled to the legal rights of persons, are
properly understood to include the unborn because that was standard, conventional term-of-
art legal usage and as such bears heavily on what the meaning of the term "person" was at
the time the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments were adopted.
Though it is not my main point here, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the term
"person," as including corporations as artificial legal persons, appears methodologically
sound as a matter of original-public-meaning textualism, even if it may be less than
intuitively obvious. And that methodological point bears on the argument concerning legal
personhood for the human fetus: If the original meaning of constitutional language is to be
understood in its time- and text-context, such meaning includes the specialized term-of-art
meaning the word had at the time. See Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note *,
at 1132 ("[W]ords, phrases, and structures might [well], in context, have a specific term-of-
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Blackstone defined natural persons, charmingly but also instructively, as
"such as the God of nature formed us."35 One of religious background or
familiarity might hear in Blackstone's formulation faint echoes of the famous
Psalm 139:
For thou didst form my inward parts, thou didst knit me together in my
mother's womb. . . . [M]y frame was not hidden from thee, when I was being
made in secret, intricately wrought in the depths of the earth. Thy eyes beheld
my unformed substance .... 36
Whether or not Blackstone had Psalm 139 specifically in view as a
theological matter, Blackstone's legal position is absolutely clear: The unborn
human fetus, gestating in the womb, is in legal contemplation a "person, " who
art meaning departing from what otherwise (that is, out of context) might have been
conventional linguistic understandings. But ascribing a term-of-art meaning is consistent
with, indeed required by, an approach that faithfully seeks to read the Constitution as a legal
text that was set forth as a whole within a particular legal and political milieu in which
particular words, phrases, or structures had a well understood even if non-literal meaning.").
A perfect, almost universally accepted illustration of the correctness of this approach is the
meaning of the term "good Behaviour" in Article III of the Constitution as a description of
the tenure by which federal judges hold office. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. "Good Behaviour"
did not mean what twenty-first century Americans mean by "good behavior"-people
acquitting themselves in an acceptable manner in their conduct. As applied to a description
of tenure of office, it was a specific legal term of art with a specific legal meaning closer to
today's more colloquial "for life, or until retirement, at the voluntary election of the
officeholder." See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Other constitutional
examples that I have used in other writing are "Establishment of Religion" and "domestic
Violence." See Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?,
supra note 11, at 876-77.
3 5 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 123 (emphasis added).
36 Psalm 139:13-16 (RSV). Blackstone, of course, would have been more familiar with
the King James Version of the Bible, which renders the passage in these terms:
For thou hast possessed my reins; thou hast covered me in my mother's womb. ... My
substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in
the lowest parts of the earth. Thy eyes did see my substance yet being unperfect, and in
thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as
yet there was none of them.
Psalm 139:13-16 (King James) (emphasis added). The Today's English Version provides an
excellent modem equivalent translation:
You created every part of me; you put me together in my mother's womb.. . . When my
bones were being formed, carefully put together in my mother's womb, when I was
growing there in secret, you knew that I was there-you saw me before I was bom. The
days allotted to me had all been recorded in your book, before any of them ever began.
Psalm 139:13-16 (TEV).
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possesses a legal right to life and to protection by the state's public and private
law, just as soon as that life can be detected by human methods ofdiscernment.
The relevant passage merits quotation at length:
I. The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation.
I. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to
stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and, by a potion
or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child
dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder,
was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But the modem law doth not
look upon this offence in quite so atrocious a light but merely as a heinous
misdemeanor.3 7
Blackstone continues:
An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in law
to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of
a copyhold estate made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is
enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such
limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point the civil law agrees
with ours. 38
Several points are striking about Blackstone's understanding, which would
have been taken by the framing generation as its own baseline. First, Blackstone
grounded the "right of personal security," including first and foremost "a
person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life," in the gift of life from
God.39 It is in that sense a "natural law" right; it is a right not conferred by law
but recognized by law, flowing from the act of divine creation of human life.
That is a preliminary point, but perhaps a not unimportant framing
consideration. 40
Second, and most importantly, the right to life exists as a right of human
"persons" and includes the right to life of unborn human persons alive and
37 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *129-30 (footnotes omitted).38 1d. at *130 (footnotes omitted).
39 Id. at *129.
40The scope and proper understanding of a legal right can certainly be affected by
whether it is conceived as a right recognized by the state and society but a natural-law right
that pre-exists and precedes the social contract of government and civil society, as opposed
to one simply conferred by civil government and its institutions. The former should not
readily be subjected to natural-rights-narrowing constructions or interpretations, while the
latter might be subject to such limits. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of
God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 1159, 1160, 1168-69 (2013) (making
this point with respect to the natural-law right to freedom of religious exercise, as it affects
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
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gestating "in the mother's womb." 41 Most emphatically and clearly, the legal
term "person" does not exclude the unborn; the right to life does not begin at
birth, but begins "in contemplation of law" much earlier-while the child is
living in the mother's womb.42 That is why killing an unborn child, by abortion
or by other deliberate wrongful harm to the mother, was regarded as a crime, by
"ancient" law.43 Abortion was regarded as a species of homicide because it was
a violation of the most fundamental right of a human "person"7-the right to the
"legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, [and] his
health." 44
It is worth pausing, briefly, to reflect on the significance of this point as
evidence of constitutional meaning of the term person in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments: The settled eighteenth-century legal meaning of the
word "person," according to the leading source on Anglo-American law at the
time and an enormously influential legal authority in the thinking of the men
who wrote the words of the original U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights
(including the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause), specifically included
the unborn. 45 If the term person, as used in the U.S. Constitution, carried
forward and embraced Blackstone's traditional, recognized term-of-art legal
understanding of the term as including living, unborn human infants-and for
the reasons stated this is a reasonable and appropriate interpretive
methodological move-that goes a long way to settling any issue of the
supposed ambiguity of the constitutional term "person," as applied to the
question of abortion. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are specifically about protection of the rights of persons-
Blackstone's discussion instantiated in written constitutional text-and about
the rights of all such persons so described to "life, liberty, and property"-
Blackstone's context once again-as against deprivation without due process.46
It would seem at least to be a very strong presumption-if indeed it is not
outright conclusive-that the U.S. constitutional term "person," if otherwise
thought ambiguous with respect to the unborn, in fact protects human life in the
womb in the same circumstances as Blackstone described. This seems very
likely to be the objective meaning that the term "person" would have had, in
social and legal context, to informed members of the general public in the
generations that framed and adopted the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Third, for Blackstone, the legal right to life-personhood-was coextensive
with the discernible presence of a new human life in the womb. In Blackstone's
formulation, there is no distinction-no wedge, so to speak-between
biological human life and legal personhood; Blackstone treated them as one and
41 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 130.




46 U.S. CONsT. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the same in his description of the rights of persons.47 Where a human life exists,
it is a legal person. The distinction that some posit today-and that was an
inarticulate premise of Roe 48-between biological human life and legal
personhood is a recent, post-modem philosophical distinction alien to both the
scientific and legal worldview of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 49 For
Blackstone, the unborn child was legally a person at the point that the existence
of a new infant human life could be detected as actively alive in the womb.50
In the eighteenth century-two hundred years before ultrasound
technology-that point of detection of new human life was pegged at when fetal
movement could be discerned, physically, by external touch or by internal
feeling. 51 This was conventionally referred to as the point of "quickening" or
"animation." 52 Blackstone's description of the trigger point for legal
personhood tracks that conventional understanding. 53 It is not altogether clear
whether Blackstone understood this to be so because of a belief that that is
when human life begins as a matter of fact-that is, that human life actually
begins at the point of animation or quickening (as many ancients and medieval
thinkers mistakenly believed)-or because he regarded quickening as a
convenient rule of evidence: that the unborn child's ability to stir within the
womb constituted sufficient proof positive of the presence of a living human
child. The former view, however unscientific under today's understanding, was
one ancient biological/theological theory of when human life in fact begins: the
baby was "formed" but not invested with a soul, and thus did not become a
living human being, until animation. 54 It is conceivable that Blackstone's legal
description simply meant to follow that old view. However, if one attends to
Blackstone's precise words, what he says is that personhood is present where
the child is "able to stir."55 Stirring appears to function as evidence of the thing,
not the thing itself-an outward and visible sign of an inward, hidden but
distinct physical life. Blackstone's standard appears to be whether there is new
47 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 130.4 8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).4 9 For examples of recent philosophers who argue that not all living human beings
should be treated as moral or legal persons, see PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 96-99,
186-88 (2d ed. 1993); Margaret Olivia Little, Abortion and the Margins of Personhood, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 331 (2008); as well as Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed
Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 370-72 (2007).50 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 129-30.
5 1 Id. at *129.
52 John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion Law: Roe's Rejection of American
History and Traditions, 22 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 5, 24 n.130 (2006).
53 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 129.54 See Keown, supra note 52, at 5 ("As early as the mid-thirteenth century the common
law punished abortion after fetal formation as homicide. Fetal formation, the point at which
the fetus assumed a recognizably human shape and was believed to be ensouled, was thought
to occur some 40 days after conception.").
55 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 129.
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human life, as judged by ability to move within the womb. Thus, where human
life can be shown to exist, legal personhood exists.
It is a nice question whether Blackstone, given his unequivocal
endorsement of legal personhood for the unborn, would have chosen conception
rather than discernible bodily movement as the correct line had eighteenth
century medical and biological knowledge been so advanced. The reality is that
Blackstone, medicine, and the law, simply did not know these things.
Blackstone's line, describing the law at the time, was therefore bodily
movement. That may not be the test preferred by most pro-life advocates today,
who focus on the point of fertilization, or conception, the point at which today's
science understands a new biological human life to have been created. 56 But
Blackstone's analysis need not be understood as inconsistent with that modern
view: Blackstone's test was life. His biological theory (and that of his era) of
when life begins may have been mistaken as a factual matter, but it is arguable
that what counts in the Blackstonian legal formulation is the general proposition
that the legal rights of persons extend to living human beings in their mothers'
wombs, whenever the presence of such life can be known with assurance, and
not the specific limitations of medical knowledge and technology of the
eighteenth century as to when that fact could be known.
Later on, I will raise the troubling methodological question whether the
legal standard for "personhood" should change with advances in biological and
scientific knowledge: Does the original meaning of a term, like "person,"
change with changed understanding of the facts that animated that specific
original legal understanding? Or, if a prior term-of-art meaning embodied a
somewhat mistaken understanding of objective facts (as opposed to social
appraisals or judgments about those facts), is the original mistaken meaning
nonetheless still the original meaning, so that improved scientific or medical
knowledge is of no legal consequence? 57 For now, however, it is sufficient to
note that the question of limited contemporaneous scientific knowledge forming
original meaning is different from the question of new technological advances
permitting detection of things that fit within a term's original meaning even if
they would not have been discernable at the time the legal term was enacted. To
be concrete: If a human embryo or fetus was in fact "able to stir" in the
mother's womb at a given point in pregnancy, but no one in the 1760s could
have detected it so stirring at that point, was the child "able to stir"? The answer
56 See, e.g., KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN:
CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 2 (7th ed. 2003) ("A zygote is the beginning of a new
human being (i.e., an embryo)."); Maureen L. Condic, Preimplantation Stages of Human
Development: The Biological and Moral Status ofEarly Embryos, in Is THIS CELL A HUMAN
BEING? 25, 25-41 (A. Suarez & J. Huarte eds., 2011); Maureen L. Condic, When Does
Human Life Begin?: A Scientific Perspective 1-12 (1 Westchester Inst. White Paper Series,
2008), available at http://www.westchesterinstitute.net/images/wi whitepaperlifeprint.
pdf; see also ROBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF
HUMAN LIFE 27-56 (2008) (setting forth science of human embryology).
57 See infra Part VI.
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clearly is yes. The child was able to stir, and thus fit within the legal category of
personhood; the inability of eighteenth century medicine or technology to detect
fetal movement until a later point in pregnancy does not alter that reality and
properly forms no part of the legal meaning of the term person.58 Blackstone's
use of the phrase "quick with child" thus appears less part of the definition of
the personhood of the unborn than a description of when such distinct
personhood was detectable and recognizable in the eighteenth century, given
that time's more limited medical understanding and technological capacities. 59
Fourth, the fact that the legal understanding of "person" includes the unborn
does not, for Blackstone, seem to depend upon the precise content of the
common law or criminal law with respect to abortion prohibitions.60 Nor,
conversely, does the legal personhood of the unborn determine what the specific
content of the criminal and tort law with respect to abortion and other wrongful
acts resulting in fetal death must be. Legal personhood status is one thing. The
content and details of criminal and tort law for the protection of persons,
including the unborn, is another. Of course, the fact that abortion had long been
considered a serious criminal offense (the level of seriousness and the degree of
punishment varying) and that death of the fetus from an injurious wrong done to
the mother also was considered a crime, as well as a tort, was practice
58 This answer seems, if anything, clearer and methodologically easier than the issue of
whether new instances, or new phenomena, or new technologies or media, fall within the
original meaning of legal categories that were enacted at a time when such instances,
phenomena, technologies or media did not yet exist. Consider a familiar modem analogy: Is
television or the internet within the scope of protection of "the freedom of speech, or of the
press," within the original meaning of the First Amendment? The short answer is yes. Digital
cyberspace is a new type (so to speak) of "press." It is a new instance of an old category.
Expression by television or radio fits within the original meaning of the word "speech." It is
a new medium of speech. And so on: A term's original objective public meaning is not
limited by the then-known instances or examples of items that fit within the category
described by that meaning.
A fortiori, new or enhanced ability to detect or discern items or instances that always
were recognized as fitting within a legal category (here, unbom, living human beings in the
womb) are not excluded from a legal category simply because they could not have been
detected at the time. A stirring human fetus whose stirrings could not have been detected in
the eighteenth century until a later point is not a new instance of the term "person" as used
by Blackstone. It is, rather, a classic example of the term. New technology simply makes its
occurrence knowable more readily, and earlier, than it would have been in Blackstone's era.59A different interpretive question would be presented if Blackstone were properly
read to say that a fetus becomes a legal person because ability to stir is what defines
personhood-that what makes the unborn child a "person"- is his or her ability to stir (as
opposed to what constitutes sufficient evidence from which one can conclude that a distinct
living person is in fact present in the womb). In such case, the question would be whether an
eighteenth-century legal rule that stirring equals personhood should be revised in light of
new factual information establishing that the existence of a new living human organism is a
function of the fertilization of the egg by the sperm, not a function of stirring. See infra
Part VI.
60 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 130.
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consistent with and supporting Blackstone's overall conclusion that the unborn
human fetus is, in legal contemplation, a person possessing rights to life and to
legal protection by the state from harm inflicted by other individuals. 61 But that
general conclusion does not appear to have been dependent in any significant
way on the details of what degree of homicide-whether "murder,"
"manslaughter," or some less atrocious "heinous misdemeanor"-was attached
to a specific wrongful act, or on the proof requirements the criminal law
imposed for conviction of a certain crime.
Blackstone is powerful evidence of the specific legal meaning of the word
"person" in standard late-eighteenth-century Anglo-American usage. And, in
addition to Blackstone's widespread general authoritative status, there is at least
some evidence that Blackstone's specific understanding that legal personhood
includes the unborn was accepted and espoused by America's leading legal
scholars.62 If America had its own Blackstone at the end of the eighteenth
century it might have been James Wilson, a leading legal scholar, one of the
two or three most important draftsmen of the U.S. Constitution (with Madison
and Morris), the chief architect of Article III of the Constitution (the article
concerning the judicial powers), and one of the original justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court.63 Wilson's famous 1791 Lectures on Law are the nearest
American equivalent to Blackstone's Commentaries and are strong
contemporaneous evidence of the American legal understanding at the time of
the meaning of "person." 64 Echoing Blackstone, Wilson declared that "life, and
whatever is necessary for the safety of life, are the natural rights of man." 65 This
seemed so obvious to Wilson as not to admit of discussion or demonstration:
"Some things are so difficult; others are so plain, that they cannot be proved." 66
Wilson then set forth his understanding of when the natural right to life of all
persons begins, in terms tracking Blackstone identically:
With consistency, beautiful and undeviating, human life, from its
commencement to its close, is protected by the common law. In the
contemplation of law, life begins when the infant is first able to stir in the
womb. [Wilson drops a footnote specifically citing Blackstone's
Commentaries as authority for this point.] By the law, life is protected not only
61 See id. at *129.
62 See JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
749, 1068 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
63 AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 476; see also
Nicholas Pedersen, The Lost Founder: James Wilson in American Memory, 22 YALE J.L. &
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from immediate destruction, but from every degree of actual violence, and, in
some cases, from every degree of danger. 67
Wilson follows Blackstone: The unborn are persons within the
contemplation of the law; such life, and the protections of the law, begin at the
time of human life's "commencement," which was then discernible when the
infant was "first able to stir" in his or her mother's womb. 68 Wilson's words are
not direct "legislative history" concerning a specific intended meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. (Wilson, an early and strong federalist advocate for
ratification of the Constitution in Philadelphia, had a few years earlier voiced
his opposition to the argument that a Bill of Rights was necessary.) 69 But they
are good evidence that the Blackstonian understanding of the extent of the
rights of persons-specifically as including the unborn-was accepted in elite
American legal discourse and political theory. Blackstone's legal definition of
"person" was America's legal definition of "person."
We can begin to reach a provisional conclusion as to the original public
meaning of the word "person" in the Constitution, as it concerns the right to life
of the unborn: If the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's usage
of the word "person" can fairly be taken as reflecting, in the absence of
convincing contrary evidence, Blackstone's legal descriptions and definitions-
and for reasons noted earlier this seems an eminently sound (if not absolutely
ironclad) step as a matter of constitutional interpretive method-then the
original public meaning of "person" in these American constitutional texts
carries forward the understanding of informed users of the English language at
the time that living, unborn human beings gestating in the womb are, legally,
persons vested with the right to life as soon as their existence as a distinct,
individual human being can be discerned. If standard eighteenth century legal
usage is a good guide to the meaning of the word "person" in a new, eighteenth-
century constitutional text protecting human rights-and if nineteenth-century
adoption of essentially identical constitutional language does not reflect any
changed meaning to the term-that tends very heavily to resolve the surface
ambiguity of the word "person," as applied to the unborn, in the direction of
inclusion. This does not itself dictate any particular criminal-law or tort-law
regime with respect to abortion and wrongful death: Blackstone did not suggest
671d. at 1068. Wilson goes on to note that there are various "grades of solicitude,
discovered, by the law, on the subject of life" and that the law frequently distinguished
"different degrees of aggression" toward life, ranging from threats to assaults to homicides.
Id "How those different degrees may be justified, excused, alleviated, aggravated,
redressed, or punished, will appear both in the criminal and in the civil code of our
municipal law." Id.
68Id
69 James Wilson, Speech at the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 167, 167-68 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
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that it did,70 and it thus would not be at all surprising that American criminal
law and common law in the several states might vary in significant respects
concerning abortion, punishment, and the legal protection given the unborn. But
it does go a long way toward establishing a right-to-life-for-the-unbom baseline
for consideration of what legal regimes comport with due process of law before
such life may be taken by state action and with the state's duty to provide
"equal protection of the laws" to all such persons. And most basically of all: It
goes a long way to refuting, by directly contradicting at the outset, the premise
on which Roe's creation of an exactly opposite constitutional right depends.
But it does not, quite, seal the deal. The plain, common meaning of
"person," as used at the time of the adoption of the relevant constitutional texts,
certainly does not categorically preclude inclusion of the unborn. The technical,
specialized legal-definition meaning of "person," as set forth in Blackstone, the
definitive, authoritative legal text of the time in America as in England,
specifically includes the unborn, and America's leading legal scholars, and the
Constitution's drafters, had Blackstone in view as such a defining source of
legal meaning.71 Based on this evidence, the better conclusion by far-indeed,
the presumptively single-right-answer answer-is that the word "person" as
used in the Constitution includes the unborn. But the conclusion does not
remain absolutely airtight. The word "person" remains at least to some degree
ambiguous on this specific question. If proceeding on the basis of text and
original textual meaning alone, without more, the conclusion would almost
certainly be that Roe is wrong on this point. (And indeed some constitutional
interpretive methodologies would therefore stop here.) But there is at least
enough uncertainty to warrant inquiry into other evidence arguably relevant to
constitutional meaning. If other indicia of textual meaning-embedded in the
Constitution's structure and other parts of its text, or evidence of original
intention or historical practice-pointed in the opposite direction with sufficient
force and clarity, that might well undermine the suggestion that constitutional
personhood extends to the unborn. To those other factors we now turn.
III. STRUCTURE
A. Structure, Inference, Intratextual Usage
Does the Constitution's structure and internal logic, or its use of the word
"person" elsewhere in the Constitution, shed light on the meaning of "person"
in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, with respect to the unborn? That is,
does the text as a whole and considered in relation to its constituent parts, or a
valid inference from other textual uses of a term, suggest a particular meaning
of "person"?
70 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *129.
71 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Arguments from the Constitution's overall structural design, and the
inferences that validly can be drawn therefrom, have been a staple of
constitutional argument since at least McCulloch v. Maryland, which in many
ways exemplifies the genre.72 McCulloch is as much an argument from the logic
of broad grants of general powers to the national government, and the logic of
national constitutionalism and national sovereignty, as it is an interpretation
specifically of particular clauses like the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article
I, Section Eight, and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.73 Indeed, in the
category of early, famous Supreme Court cases, Marbury v. Madison is a case
of this type, too: Marbury's argument for judicial review and, by implication,
for coordinate constitutional review by all branches of government, as a broader
proposition, is an argument from the Constitution's foundational structural
postulate of the separation, independence, and co-equal authority of the several
branches of the national government, combined with the whole-text structural-
textual proposition of constitutional supremacy. 74
Arguments like McCulloch's and Marbury's, from constitutional structure,
logic, and the relationships entailed by that structure and logic are really nothing
more than sophisticated textual arguments. They are arguments about the text's
original meaning, in overall context, considered as a whole and evaluating the
relationship of its constituent parts and provisions to one another.
So too are arguments of the sort Professor Akhil Amar has dubbed
"intratextualism"-arguments that the meaning of a constitutional term in a
particular article, amendment, or clause may be informed by that term's (or a
related one's) meaning and usage elsewhere within the document. 75 This
undoubtedly is a type of textual argument, but one with a structure-and-
relationship angle. Intratextualism looks for linguistic clues to a term's meaning
72 A "structural" or "logic-of-the-document" or "first-premises-of-constitutionalism-
yield-necessary-derived-conclusions" method was characteristic of several of the early
classic constitutional opinions of Chief Justice Marshall. See generally, e.g., Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). On Marshall's use of this method in
Marbury, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 2706, 2711 (2003) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth].
73 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316-17, 324, 330, 396, 406,
418-22 (1819); see also AMAR, AMERICA'S UNwRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at
22-31 (discussing McCulloch in such a vein).
74 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 226-27, 241-44 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, Most
Dangerous Branch] (setting forth and describing a quasi-"Euclidean" methodology of
deriving valid "theorems" from structural constitutional "postulates" and premises, and
attributing the proposition of judicial review to a similar methodology); see also Paulsen,
The Irrepressible Myth, supra note 72, at 2711-12 (setting forth the structural argument for
judicial review as explicated in Marbury). The classic work on the structural method of
constitutional interpretation remains my teacher Charles Black's book. CHARLES L. BLACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
75 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 748 (1999).
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at one place in the text by looking at its use in another place in the text. As
Amar colorfully puts it, the technique is essentially one of "using the
Constitution as its own dictionary." 76
McCulloch is notable for this maneuver, too (as Amar details at some
length).77 An important step in Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning supporting a
broad range of congressional choice of means, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, was the rejection of a restricted, narrow sense of the word
"necessary."78 In a key passage that has come to be regarded as stating
fundamental principles of careful textual interpretation, Marshall first
demonstrated that the word "necessary" had a range of meaning, depending on
its usage in a particular linguistic context.79 (I will return to this important idea
of "range of meaning" later.) Then, Marshall noted that Article I, Section Ten,
used the qualifying term "absolutely necessary" where the narrower sense was
specifically intended.80 The absence of words of restriction or qualification in
76 1d at 756.
77 See id. at 756-58.
78 See id.
79 Marshall asked:
Is it true, that this [narrow meaning] is the sense in which the word "necessary" is
always used? Does it always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one
thing, to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist without that other? We
think it does not. If reference be had to its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in
approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than that one thing is
convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an end,
is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not
as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely
unattainable. Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the
mind, in all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more common than to use
words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in
their rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously
intended. It is essential to just construction, that many words which import something
excessive, should be understood in a more mitigated sense-in that sense which
common usage justifies. The word "necessary" is of this description. It has not a fixed
character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; and is often
connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind
receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely
or indispensably necessary.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-14 (1819).
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws. . . ." See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
414-15 ("This comment on the word ['necessary'] is well illustrated, by the passage cited at
the bar, from the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution. It is, we think, impossible
to compare the sentence which prohibits a State from laying 'imposts, or duties on imports
or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,' with
that which authorizes Congress 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution' the powers of the general government, without feeling a conviction
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the Necessary and Proper Clause, Marshall concluded, (intra-)textually implied
that no such more-restrictive sense of the word was required in Article I,
Section Eight, Clause Eighteen.81 This buttressed McCulloch's fundamental
conclusion that the Necessary and Proper Clause afforded Congress a broad
range of choice to consider the means it judged best for carrying into execution
other grants of legislative power.82 (I will return to this important
methodological point presently as well.)
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Roe makes a fairly detailed argument
of this intra-textualist comparative sort, against the personhood of the fetus, by
examining how the word "person" is used elsewhere in the Constitution.83 After
a rapid scavenger hunt through a number of such references, including three
references in the Fourteenth Amendment itself, Justice Blackmun's opinion
concludes that, "in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it
has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has
any possible pre-natal application." 84
Blackmun's observations here are partially correct, but his reasoning is
severely defective. To the extent Blackmun draws an inference against pre-natal
personhood from other contexts in which the word "person" is used elsewhere
in the Constitution, the inference simply is not warranted. (Indeed, in just a
moment I will suggest that the better-though by no means necessary-
inference is precisely the reverse of the one Blackmun draws.) Begin with this
obvious point: The fact that, in several instances, the Constitution uses the word
"person" in a context that could only apply to born persons-and often to a
limited subset of them (e.g., those of a certain age, those who are also
"citizens," or those who have been elected or appointed to a certain office)--
tells us nothing about whether, outside that specific context, the word's meaning
might not be so limited. Indeed, the fact that the word "person" is, in these other
contexts, qualified and limited by additional, more specific modifying words of
restriction, could be taken to suggest precisely the opposite inference: Where
"person" was intended in a more limited sense than all living human beings
(unborn as well as born) or was meant to apply specifically only to born human
beings (as with the Citizenship Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment); or where a particular provision was intended to apply only to
some subset of persons, the Constitution's framers often included words of
limitation to narrow or qualify the word "person." Where no such limitation was
intended, the general word "person" was used without qualification, implying
that the convention understood itself to change materially the meaning of the word
'necessary,' by prefixing the word 'absolutely.' This word, then, like others, is used in
various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person
using them, are all to be taken into view.").
81 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-21.
821d. at 419-21.
83 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).84Id.
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the propriety of according it a broader meaning.85
Such reasoning would parallel McCulloch's: It is, as John Marshall put it
(perhaps a bit exuberantly), "impossible to compare" 86 the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment, defining citizenship as extending to certain born or
naturalized persons, with the second, which speaks initially about the privileges
or immunities of such citizens but then turns more broadly to the rights of
persons not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process or
denied equal protection87 (without limitation to "born or naturalized" persons),
"without feeling a conviction"88 that prefixing the words born or naturalized
materially changed the meaning of persons. Or to put it in colloquial twenty-
first-century language: "[P]ersons born or naturalized in the United States"
means something different from simply "persons." 89 To suggest, on the basis of
this text at least, that one must be born to be a person-that "born" somehow
defines "person"-would be silly. By the same reasoning, one could as easily
say (indeed, one would have to say) that one must be "born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' 90 to be a person. On such a
reading, aliens are not persons and neither are members of Native American
Indian tribes not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This is simply
absurd, and highlights the absurdity of reading the words surrounding "person"
as defining "person." Born or naturalized are words of limitation, not definition.
They describe a subset of the class of persons. They do not define the meaning
of "persons" itself.
Nor do those provisions concerning how old a person must be to be
president,91 a senator,92 or a representative. 93 Age is by convention measured
from the date of birth. But that does not mean that personhood therefore must
be measured from birth. They are simply two different things. (And, as noted
above, there is ample original-meaning evidence that the convention was that
legal personhood was recognized from the time that an unborn child could be
discerned as a separate life in the mother's womb.) 94
85 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.86 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819).
87U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.88 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414.
89 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
90 Id
91 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
9 3 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
9 4 See supra Part II.B. Interestingly, the familiar Western convention of beginning to
count age from the point of birth is not universal. In certain East Asian countries, a newborn
traditionally was given the age of "one," arguably reflecting the recognition that the child's
life predated his or her birth. See, e.g., HYUNJOO PARK & YULING PAN, COGNITIVE
INTERVIEWING WITH ASIAN POPULATIONS: FINDINGS FROM CHINESE AND KOREAN
INTERVIEWS 20 (2007), available at www.rti.org/pubs/aapor07_park pres.pdf (Korea); Ye
Qinfa, Chinese Culture: Birthday Customs of the Newborn and Elderly, ABouT.COM,
http://chineseculture.about.com/library/weekly/aa021901a.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2013)
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The constitutional provisions that use the word "person" in reference to
appointments, 95 emoluments, 96 extradition,97 and other such uses naturally have
application only to born persons. Justice Blackmun's Roe opinion is correct
about this.98 But it is hard to see how this has much probative weight one way
or another. To be appointed to office, to be extradited for commission of a
crime, to be a fugitive, or to receive emoluments, one presumably must already
be born. But again, that does not define the word person; it simply uses it in one
common sense.
A somewhat better intra-textual argument against "persons" including the
unborn is the use of "persons" in the Constitution's clauses describing
representation rules and the census. 99 The Roe opinion included these
provisions in its laundry list of the Constitution's uses of the word "person," but
did not give the point much separate attention.100 The infamous Three-Fifths
Clause of the original Constitution, later superseded by the Fourteenth
Amendment, provided for apportioning representatives and direct taxes by
"adding to the whole Number of free Persons, . . . three-fifths of all other
Persons."10 The Constitution assigned initial representation numbers and then
directed that a census be taken within three years of the first meeting of
Congress, and within every ten years after that. 102 (Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment did away with the three-fifths rule and provides simply:
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.") 103
Again, by convention, the unborn are not counted in a census.104 In a sense,
then, conceived but unborn children are literally not counted as constitutional
"persons"-at least not so counted for purposes of apportionment of
(China); Baby & Birth in China, 4PANDA.COM, www.4panda.com/chinatips/culture/baby.htm
(last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (same); About the Chart, CHINESEGENDERCHART.INFO,
www.chinesegenderchart.info/pregnancy-chart-gender-selection/oneyear.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013) (same). This fact is of course not itself probative of the meaning of the word
"person" in the Constitution. It merely tends to confirm that the dating of age from birth is
simply a cultural convention and does not establish the point at which a person becomes a
"person."
9 5 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
97 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
98 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
99 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
100 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
101 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis
added).
102 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
103 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
104See Explore the Form, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
www.census.gov/2010census/about/interactive-form.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2013) (2010
U.S. Census Form).
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representatives. That tradition of not counting the unborn appears to have been
carried forward in Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
amendment in which the word "person" is used in the context under
examination here, in Section One. This seems the best intra-textual evidence
suggesting a determinate constitutional meaning of "person" as limited to born
persons-those who would be, literally, counted as persons in a census
prescribed by the Constitution.105 It is not the strongest of arguments: who is
counted in the counting is a matter of convention; the Constitution prescribes
that there be a counting but does not say who counts in such counting-other
than in its provisions concerning "other persons" (the hideous three-fifths rule)
and "Indians not taxed." 06 Indeed, these examples might be taken to suggest
that where the document intends that a person not be counted, or counted
differently, it specifies so. This undermines, at least somewhat, the already
uncertain strength of the intratextual inference from the representation and
census clauses.
Still, the intratextual inference is there and is at least somewhat troubling.
The Roe opinion noted the representation and census provisions in its laundry
list of constitutional uses of the word person, and gave it a small amount of
extra consideration in a one-sentence footnote: "We are not aware that in the
taking of any census under this clause, a fetus has ever been counted." 0 7
Perhaps not, but this bare factual observation provokes a more interesting legal
question: Could Congress specify that conceived but unborn humans be counted
in a census-that, in the official head count, a pregnant woman add two (or
perhaps more) to the census total, rather than just one?
The proposition is far from absurd. Given Blackstone's baseline rule that
the life of a new person exists in legal contemplation when able to stir in the
mother's womb,108 Congress might well have prescribed such a rule for
counting persons if it had thought it a better, more accurate, and convenient one.
The fact that Congress never in fact did so does not tell us much of anything
about the necessary meaning of the word "person" in the Constitution-
especially not if Congress could have chosen a count-the-unborn rule for a
census. If failure to count proves anything, it is probably only that, if Congress
considered the matter at all, it judged counting the unborn too inconvenient or
difficult (especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), or too intrusive,
to be worth the effort. A born-person implementation of the census requirement
was a sufficient counting rule for census purposes.' 09
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
106 d. Corporations are treated as legal persons for Fourteenth Amendment purposes,
see supra note 34 and accompanying text, but they are not counted as persons in the census,
see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 104.
107 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 n.53 (1973).
108 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
109 Today, of course, pregnancy can, and frequently does, result in the death of the fetus
by abortion, in addition to miscarriage, but that is largely a function of the legal regime of
Roe. That simply begs the question in chief: whether Roe's holding on the question of
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But indulge the hypothetical for a moment. Suppose Congress had at some
point chosen, or chose today, a different rule. Suppose Congress prescribed,
pursuant to its Necessary and Proper Clause power, that living human fetuses be
counted in the census. (Or, since the apportionment-representation command as
modified now appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, suppose Congress chose
such a rule pursuant to its power under Section Five of the amendment to enact
"appropriate" laws to enforce the amendment's provisions.) Would such a law
be unconstitutional, on the theory that it is beyond Congress's power to pass
laws for carrying into execution the Constitution's provision for a census and
resulting apportionment of representatives?
Writing on a clean slate-that is, in the absence of Roe's influence on the
question-the answer would seem to be no. Under McCulloch's reasoning, such
a choice almost certainly would be thought within the scope of Congress's
power to devise a means (of counting) calculated to achieve the end (a
census).Ilo Just as "necessary" was to some degree indeterminate,111 affording
Congress a range of choice and judgment, so too "persons" to be counted is to
some degree indeterminate, affording Congress a range of choice and judgment.
It is hard to see why Congress could not prescribe that fetuses be counted in the
census, aside from the force of Roe on this point (which of course is the point
ultimately at issue).
This thought experiment obviously suggests a further implication. If
Congress constitutionally may prescribe that the unborn be treated as "persons"
for purposes of census and apportionment, may it not likewise constitutionally
prescribe that the unborn be considered "persons" for purposes of not being
deprived of life without due process and for purposes of entitlement to the
protection of the laws? The power of Congress-the power to prescribe an
appropriate rule for effectuating ends-is the same in either case: Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment (which is really just a linguistic variation on the
wording of the Necessary and Proper Clause).112
The intra-textual comparative argument thus works both ways. If the range
of plausible meaning of "persons" is broad enough to encompass the unborn
with respect to Congress's power to prescribe a census method, it is broad
enough to encompass the unborn with respect to Congress's power to protect
from state action the rights to life and protection. The whole question, then, is
whether the constitutional term "person" has a range of meaning that plausibly
could encompass the unborn or is entirely determinate in excluding the unborn.
personhood is correct or not. The fact that a "person" might die or be deliberately killed is
not a reason to conclude that such a person was not a "person" when he or she was alive.
I10 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-21 (1819).
Ill Id. at 413-15.
l2 Paulsen, Government of Adequate Powers, supra note 11, at 1002 ("The Civil War
Amendments' enforcement clauses are most naturally read as new, sweeping 'necessary and
proper' clauses. They grant Congress broad power to pass 'appropriate' legislation to
enforce some pretty broadly-worded, generally-expressed limitations on state government
power.").
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B. Structural Default Rules for Textual Ambiguity
This brings us to another-and vitally important-"structural" interpretive
methodological question: What is the correct default rule with respect to
interpreting and applying a provision of the Constitution that, upon
examination, to some degree has a range of meaning that is not perfectly
determinate? And a corollary structural interpretive question: Might that default
rule be different for judicial interpretation and application of a constitutional
provision-that is, with respect to a decision to invalidate legislative action-
than it is for political actors exercising their constitutional legislative and
executive powers?
Recall Justice Blackmun's punch-line conclusion to his quick intra-textual
canvass of the use of the words "person" and "persons" throughout the
Constitution: "[I]n nearly all these instances," he wrote, "the use of the word is
such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance,
that it has any possible pre-natal application."ll 3 The implication, unstated but
clearly present, is that the absence of decisive proof of prenatal application
refutes any such possibility of prenatal application. We have already seen the
several weaknesses of the premise: the fact that some uses of the word person
obviously concern born persons only is not particularly probative of whether the
term might, in different settings, include unborn persons; the use of qualifying
language (like "born") in some such textual provisions might actually be taken
to support the contrary inference that a broader meaning is embraced where not
so qualified;"l 4 and the backdrop legal understanding of personhood recognized
by Blackstone suggests precisely such a broader understanding." 5 But even
granting Roe's premise that other textual uses do not reliably endorse
personhood for the unborn,11 6 the conclusion does not follow that the word
person therefore does not include the unborn. Rather, what would follow from
lack of supportive intra-textual evidence is, simply, lack of supportive intra-
textual evidence. The question whether "persons" includes the unborn would
remain up for grabs; to the extent the text is thought ambiguous as it concerns
that question, a lack of corroborating intra-textual evidence simply retains the
sense of ambiguity.
This brings us back to the question of the appropriate default rules. Justice
Blackmun's approach in Roe, rejecting personhood on the ground of insufficient
textual proof, "7 would seem improperly to reverse the presumption. If the text
is ambiguous as to a particular point, then the judiciary is not justified in
adopting one reading over another-where either or several fall within the range
of meaning of the text-and then using such a reading to invalidate a choice
113 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
14 See supra pp. 38-39.
115 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
'16 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
117d
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adopted by representative bodies premised on a different view fully as
consistent with the range of meaning admitted by the ambiguous text.
This is a structural-textual point about the power of "judicial review" in
relation to the powers of representative institutions in a constitutional
democracy where the text of the Constitution is ambiguous or indeterminate on
a particular question. The structural argument for judicial review, as set forth in
Marburyll8 (and before that in The Federalist No. 78),119 rests on the premise
that an action of the political branches or of the states violates some rule of law
supplied with sufficient clarity by the text of the Constitution that it can be said
that the political decision violates the Constitution's command or prohibition.120
Conversely, where the text does not specify a rule, or where the text's
application to a given problem is not clearly resolved by the text, the argument
for a power of judicial review-the power to invalidate political decisions as
being contrary to the text of the Constitution-no longer holds. As I have put
the point in prior writing: "It is essential, then-it is part of the core justification
of judicial review-that the court conclude that the legislative act violates a rule
of law that is set forth by the text of the Constitution before it strikes down the
act."121 If the text supplies no such rule, or if its rule or principle is so
indeterminate that it cannot fairly be said that the Constitution decides the issue,
then the rationale for judicial review fails; the choice made by political
institutions stands because it cannot be said to be in definite conflict with-in
Hamilton's words in The Federalist No. 78, in "irreconcilable variance" with-
the Constitution.122 Thus, "the more indeterminate or under-determinate the
range of a constitutional provision, the broader the duty of the courts to defer to
what the legislature has enacted."l 23
118 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
I19See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
120 See Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note *, at 1129-30 n.54 ("[W]here
there is a range of equally legitimate interpretations, and the political branches have chosen
one of them, there is no basis for the courts to invalidate the political branches' choice. This
is because the exercise of judicial review presupposes that the political branches have made
a choice that is forbidden, as a matter of law, by the Constitution. If the Constitution permits
a range of choice, and the legislature and executive have chosen one choice within that
range, what has been done is not unconstitutional."); Paulsen, Does the Constitution
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 11, at 858 n.4; Paulsen, Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 74, at 333 ("A court should not substitute its interpretation of
a text for that of the political branches (acting within their proper spheres) when more than
one interpretation is possible, there is no principled rule supplied by text, history, structure,
and precedent that privileges one reading over the other, and the political branches have
acted pursuant to one such reading.").
121 Paulsen, Government ofAdequate Powers, supra note 11, at 994.
122 THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).123 Paulsen, Government of Adequate Powers, supra note 11, at 995 (arguing that
"textual imprecision or generality often admits of a range of choices" and that the correct
constitutional answer in such circumstances "is that the legislature must be permitted to
choose from options within that range").
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McCulloch plainly embodies this same structural-interpretive premise about
what default rules govern courts where the text admits of a range of meaning.
Its first holding was, in essence, that where the text admits of a fair range of
possible meaning to a word, clause, or phrase (such as the Necessary and Proper
Clause), and Congress has made its policy judgments and acted within that
range of meaning, there is no warrant for judicial invalidation of such a
legislative choice. 124
Other scholars have articulated versions of (approximately) this same
structural principle, or one resembling it, specifically with respect to the
Fourteenth Amendment. 125 The most important such effort-and the leading
article addressing the issue specifically with respect to abortion and the question
of personhood of the unborn-is Stephen Galebach's controversial classic, A
Human Life Statute.126 Galebach's thesis, in a nutshell, was that (a) the
Supreme Court in Roe explicitly declined to say when human life begins, on the
ground that uncertainty about this fact disabled the judiciary from making such
a determination as a matter of fact or law; (b) the Court in Roe acknowledged
that if the human fetus could be thought a "person" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, its answer to the question of abortion rights would be
different, indeed diametrically contrary to the ruling it reached; and (c) that
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, under then-governing Supreme
Court precedent concerning that clause, therefore permitted Congress to make a
judgment concerning the matter of when human life begins and, consequently,
124 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-23 (1819) (explaining that
the Framers did not prescribe narrow limits on Congress's enumerated powers; that
Congress may legislate by any means "necessary and proper" to carry out legitimate ends
within the scope of the Constitution; and that "where the law is not prohibited, and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake ... to
inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the
judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.").
125 An excellent classic article is William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975). To compress greatly: Professor
Cohen's thesis is that Congress has power, at least in "marginal cases," to adopt "arguable"
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment "enlarg[ing]" the meaning of its provisions
beyond what the Supreme Court had held those provisions to mean. Id. at 618-20. Congress
may not adopt interpretations or applications of due process and equal protection not
reasonably within the scope of the Constitution's terms, but Congress's power should not be
less simply because the Supreme Court had spoken to the issue earlier. Id.; cf Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (1975) (embracing the legitimacy of a congressional role in the
"interpretive filling-out" of an "underlying constitutional guarantee"). An important recent
article, describing a broader scope for congressional as opposed to judicial interpretive
power to effectuate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as a function of their
different institutional roles and capacities is Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, Ill HARV. L. REv. 153 (1997).
126 Galebach, A Human Life Statute, supra note *, at 5.
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when constitutional legal personhood exists. All of this, Galebach argued, was
consistent for the most part with the analysis in the Roe decision itself. 127
Galebach's doctrinal argument was masterful. Unfortunately, sixteen years
later, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court rejected the argument in a
different setting, retreating substantially from its earlier doctrinal
formulations.128 That case, City of Boerne v. Flores, has been powerfully and
persuasively criticized.129 This is not the occasion to rehearse those arguments
at length.130 Suffice it to say here that, while City of Boerne may stand as a
precedent against a broad interpretation specifically of Congress's Section Five
power to legislate in ways contradicting the Supreme Court's constitutional
determination-and be relevant to the constitutional analysis of the personhood
issue, indirectly, in that sense'31-it does not directly address the question
whether the unborn are constitutional "persons" or how the text's apparently
conceded indeterminacy on this score should affect the question of interpretive
power. Still, if City ofBoerne does not reject personhood for the unborn, it does
appear, whether rightly or wrongly, implicitly to reject the proposition that
textual indeterminacy or ambiguity permits legislative choice in opposition to
the judiciary's constitutional choices.132
City of Boerne replicated, in a different context and in a different form, the
analytic error Roe made with respect to the consequence of supposed textual
ambiguity. Both cases assumed that textual ambiguity is to be resolved, one
way or the other, solely by the judiciary. Roe declared that the beginning point
of human life was uncertain, the meaning of "person" did not clearly include the
unborn, and then resolved the ambiguity by holding that the unborn were not
entitled to the constitutional protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of
Boerne held that the Court's earlier decision in Employment Division v.
127 Id. at 4-20.
128 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1997).129 See generally, e.g., Amar, supra note 75, at 818-26; McConnell, supra note 125;
Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of
Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115 (1999). I
have criticized Boerne, in passing, in other work. Paulsen, Government ofAdequate Powers,
supra note 11, at 1003 n.50 (noting that the Court's conclusions in Boerne "are probably
wrong" and arguing that "[t]he broader one's understanding of the language of Section 1, the
less one can say that it authorizes federal judicial invalidation of state action that fits within
the range of meaning admitted by such broad language; but the more one can say that the
grant of federal legislative power over such a broadly-described subject matter authorizes
broad congressional choice in such matters."); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA
Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249, 252-53
n.10 (1995) (suggesting an understanding of the Section Five Enforcement Clause power of
Congress that runs counter to the Court's holding in Boerne).
130I hope to address that issue in future work. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Dormant Fourteenth Amendment (unpublished partial manuscript) (on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal).
131 See infra Part V for a discussion of the factor of precedent.
132 But see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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Smith,133 adopting the narrower of two possible textual readings of the
(arguably ambiguous) Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, excluded
the possibility of legislative choice of the broader reading. The compound error
common to the two cases is the Court's belief that (a) textual ambiguity permits
the judiciary to adopt whichever reading it prefers (i.e., human fetuses are not
persons and thus possess no constitutional rights (Roe)); the right to the free
exercise of religion does not confer a substantive immunity from facially neutral
laws of general applicability (Smith and City of Boerne); and (b) that judicial
supremacy then permits the Court to exclude legislation premised on a different
reading of the ambiguous text.
The correct answer, as a matter of first principles of constitutional structure
and logic, would seem to be exactly the reverse: where the legislature has acted
on a view consistent with the range of meaning afforded by a broadly worded or
ambiguous constitutional text, the courts cannot properly strike down such an
act as being a violation of the Constitution; correlatively, the Constitution's
separation of powers, and the structural-logical rationale for judicial review,
require that courts accept, not reject, congressional constitutional interpretive
choices that fit within the breadth of the Constitution's provisions. It follows,
then, that the default rule suggested by the Constitution's structure should lead
the courts to uphold an act of Congress interpreting "person" to include the
unborn.134
In the end, then, what conclusions are best drawn from generally accepted
structural-textual techniques of constitutional interpretation, including
intratextual linguistic comparisons of the word "person" and structural
principles governing constitutional interpretation and appropriate default rules
in cases of ambiguity? The evidence again appears to lean rather more heavily
133 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
134 It likewise would seem to be the case that, absent a congressional enactment, a state
legislature's laws protecting the unborn as persons should be upheld as consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment unless such laws fall outside the range of meaning permitted by the
language of the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of that
amendment.
It would seem to follow from the structural logic of the Fourteenth Amendment as both
a grant of rights and also of congressional power with respect to their enforcement, that,
where the language of the Fourteenth Amendment admits of a range of choice, Congress's
choice within that range prevails over a state legislature's choice, to the extent of any
inconsistency. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406 (Supremacy Clause holding). Thus,
to the extent the Fourteenth Amendment is thought ambiguous on the meaning of "person,"
Congress can define "person" to include the unborn and its determination should prevail as
against conflicting state laws and even the Supreme Court's prior interpretations. If
Congress were to enact a definition of "person" that specifically excluded the unborn, that
interpretation, too, would prevail over contrary state legislative enactments (unless, that is,
the necessary correct reading of the word "person," as a matter of text, structure, and history,
is that it includes the unborn-a conclusion that the evidence collected in this Article
suggests is entirely plausible, and certainly far more colorable than is the reverse position
adopted in Roe).
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in the direction of concluding that the word "person" does not necessarily
exclude the unborn and certainly admits of a considered legislative choice by
Congress affirmatively to include the unborn pursuant to its power to carry into
execution the language of the Fourteenth Amendment and make interpretive
choices falling within the range of the text's meaning in the course of doing so.
The word "person" as used in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is not
defined or limited by how "person" or "persons" is used in other contexts or
specific applications elsewhere in the Constitution. Such different uses of the
word person in different contexts in the document are, to some extent,
constitutional apples and oranges. One could as readily conclude that limiting
language narrowing or qualifying the "persons," included in other contexts but
not in the context of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, suggests a
broader, general meaning where the narrower, specialized meaning is not
specified. And a strong structural argument can be made-albeit one at odds
with the Supreme Court's City of Boerne precedent-that the lack of a
definitive textual answer should afford legislatures, rather than courts, the
discretion to act pursuant to reasonable understandings falling within the range
of meaning afforded by textual indeterminacy.
IV. HISTORY AND EVIDENCE OF "ORIGINAL INTENT"
To this point, I have been considering only the original linguistic meaning
of the words of the text itself-searching for clues to its objective meaning as an
autonomous text, in its original historical and linguistic context-and the logical
inferences and deductions that objectively can be said to flow from the larger
structure and interrelationships created by the text. Both inquiries seek the
objective meaning of the words; both focus, at different levels, on the text itself;
both inquiries are, in a sense, "internal" to the text. While extrinsic sources may
prove helpful to this inquiry-sometimes providing historical or social context,
sometimes serving as an external glossary, concordance, or dictionary
explaining the contemporaneous and term-of-context meaning of a particular
word or phrase-the object is still to ascertain the meaning of the words and not
to divine the subjective intentions or expectations or purposes of the lawgiver
lurking behind the text. The goal has been to ascertain what the text means, not
what its drafters (or adopters) meant.
There is a difference between these two things, or very well may be in a
given case. As I have put the point elsewhere: "There is a logical and important
difference between the content of a legal rule and the expected consequences of
the rule in the minds of (some of) its drafters and advocates." 35 Consider some
reasonably straightforward examples. First, take the case of racial segregation in
education, the issue presented in Brown v. Board of Education.136 The drafters
of the Fourteenth Amendment may or may not have specifically intended to
135 Paulsen, Paulsen, 1, Dissenting, supra note 10, at 209.136 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954).
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abolish racial segregation, but that should be less relevant than whether the
necessary intrinsic meaning of the words they used-"equal protection of the
laws"l 37-entails a principle forbidding enforced legal separation on the basis
of race.138 What the framing generation enacted as part of the Constitution was
a set of words with meaning, not a set of intentions.139 Likewise, consider the
question whether the Fourteenth Amendment has anything to say about sex-
based discrimination. Again, the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment may
not have had the equal rights of women specifically in view, but the words they
wrote forbid state denial of legal equal protection to any "person." Whatever the
precise application of that command in the context of sex-based classifications,
it cannot be denied that women are persons-and so the Fourteenth Amendment
clearly applies to sex-based classifications whether the framers of the
amendment intended such application or not. 140
Words' intrinsic meanings within a constitutional text thus can differ from
the specific, subjective intentions of the text's drafters. They may have a
broader, more encompassing intrinsic meaning and application than anyone
thought or expected they would. They might also have a narrower, more
specific, or limited meaning than the hopes, dreams, expectations, desires, or
intentions of (some of) its drafters may have been concerning the purpose or
desired effect of the provision in question.141 Intention is simply not congruent
with original linguistic meaning.
137 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
138 Paulsen, Paulsen, J., Dissenting, supra note 10, at 209; see also Paulsen, Does the
Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 11, at 901 & n. 134;
Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 74, at 227 n.23.
139 Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 74, at 227 n.23.
140 Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra
note 11, at 901-02 ("[S]tate sex discrimination is (largely) unconstitutional, assuming
women are 'persons' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, an assumption that
seems unavoidable from the perspective of original linguistic textual meaning. Of course
women are 'persons'! There is no remotely plausible textualist argument that women are not
embraced by the literal, ordinary meaning of the document's language forbidding denials of
due process of law or equal protection of the laws to any 'person.' The fact that the
Amendment's draftsmen may not have had women, but mainly race, in mind does not negate
what the Amendment says in words. The word used was 'person' and there is no reason to
believe that the men who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment did not regard women as,
legally, persons or that they used the word 'person' in some nonstandard, specialized,
technical sense so as not to mean what it ordinarily meant.").
141 An example I have used in other writing is the Presidential Qualifications Clause's
rule that the President must "have attained to the Age of thirty-five years." U.S. CONsT. art.
II, § 1, cl. 5. To construe the clause according to its drafters' intentions or purposes-most
probably, to assure a certain level of maturity and to forestall the ready possibility of lineal
dynastic successions-rather than according to the rule embodied in its text, would produce
some remarkably different results, as I have illustrated satirically in, Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for President Strom Thurmond, 13
CONsT. COMMENT. 217, 217 (1996), and also argued directly in, Paulsen, Does the
Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, supra note 11, at 879-82.
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Nonetheless, intention-what the drafters of a provision had in mind, as
shown by extrinsic evidence of what they said about the meaning and expected
consequences of the words they used-is at least relevant evidence for
constitutional interpretation. Sometimes, historical evidence of intention may
display the original public meaning of the text. 142 Sometimes, it may clarify
ambiguities as to linguistic meaning, considered without regard to history.143
Sometimes-more troublingly-it may impeach or undermine the apparent
natural linguistic meaning of the text, leading to reconsideration of a reading
otherwise presumptively warranted by the language and structure of the text.144
This is troubling because, in theory, the text controls, and not any contrary
intention. 145 Still, evidence of such contrary intention arguably doubles back on
the supposedly clear linguistic meaning, shaking one's faith in its clarity. At all
events, historical evidence of original intention is at least worth looking at, on
most constitutional questions.
What, then, was the "original intention" (if there was one) of the framers, or
the original understanding of the ratifiers, of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments (again, if there was one) with respect to whether "persons"
includes the unborn? The unsurprising answer is that the evidence is
ambiguous. As I have written previously: "There is no decisive evidence of the
meaning of the word 'person,' at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, as applied to the protection of the laws for human fetuses and embryos
against the private violence of others." 46 This was because "[t]he meaning of
the word 'person' was not the focus of interpretive controversy, and abortion
was not a major legal issue, with thirty-six states or territorial legislatures
prohibiting it in many or most situations."147
Evidence of original intention ("what did the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment have in mind with respect to abortion?") is sparse precisely
because the framers appear not to have had abortion in mind at all when writing
the amendment. That does not mean that the Amendment therefore does not
apply to abortion, nor does it mean that the word "persons" therefore excludes
the unborn. It simply means that evidence of intention will not be especially
prominent in answering the question of textual meaning on this point.
What evidence there is, however, tends to lean in the direction of a broadly
inclusive understanding of "persons" as essentially synonymous with all human
14 2 See Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note *, at 1142-48.14 3 See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, supra note *, at
361-95.
144 For a debatable application of this principle see, for example, Paulsen, Accusing
Justice, supra note 10, at 52-62 (arguing-perhaps unsoundly-that very strong evidence of
contrary intention can in certain circumstances prevail over apparent linguistic textual
meaning, at least where formulated at a high level of generality).
14 5 See Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?,
supra note 11, at 872-76.
146 Paulsen, Paulsen, J, Dissenting, supra note 10, at 209.
14 7 d.
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beings, regardless of age, class, sex, or status. The emphasis was less on what
the category of "man" or "human being" embraced-analysis that would be
directly relevant to whether a fetus is a person-but on repudiating any
suggestion that society could rightfully exclude from the rights of persons any
class or member of the human race. 148 Existence as a member of the human
race, not social standing, merit, or any other attribute, made someone a "person"
within the intended coverage of the Constitution's most fundamental guarantees
of rights. To the extent that is relevant at all to the issue of fetal personhood, it
is only indirectly relevant: it rejects, at a general level, the idea of exclusion
from the rights of personhood of certain classes of individuals; but it does not
say anything direct about whether an unborn child is such an individual person
within the intended scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. The level of generality
in the discussion is high: human status, as such, is treated as the touchstone of
personhood.
The most apposite quasi-definitional such usages of "person" during the
period come from the lips of some of the most important draftsmen, sponsors,
and advocates of the Fourteenth Amendment-Thaddeus Stevens, John
Bingham, and Lyman Trumbull. If there could be said to be a triumvirate or
"holy trinity" of key figures with respect to the proposal of the Fourteenth
Amendment, whose purposes or intentions should matter most, Stevens,
Bingham, and Trumbull would probably qualify. Add to that the statements-
the constitutional interpretations, really-of men like the influential radical
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, and the statements of a few others,
and a general picture begins to take shape of the probable understanding and
"original intent" of the Reconstruction generation draftsmen with respect to the
meaning of the word "person."l49
What follows is a quick canvass of such statements, but with a caveat:
These statements are not direct "legislative history" concerning the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, in the sense of being floor statements or speeches
or official sponsors' reports explicating the meaning of the word "persons" as
used in that proposed amendment. They are thus of somewhat limited probative
value. Nonetheless, they are roughly contemporaneous statements, soaked in the
relevant constitutional language, that were integrally part of the constitutional
debate of the time. To the extent evidence of intention is relevant to
constitutional meaning, the statements of these men supply relevant but
unspecific evidence of a generally liberal, inclusive intention with respect to the
meaning of "persons." To the extent they might be thought to function as a kind
of working concordance displaying contemporaneous understandings of the
term person, they are arguably relevant also as good secondary evidence of the
148 See infra notes 149-65 and accompanying text.
149 For outstanding historical treatments of Reconstruction, including discussions of the
central role 'of these men in the processes leading to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877, at 228-80 (1988) (Chapter 6: "The Making of Radical Reconstruction"); EARL
M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTrrUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990).
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original public meaning of the word "person," irrespective of any specific
intention with respect to abortion.
Consider, first, the mid-Civil War 1862 remarks of the respected radical
Republican Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, whose broadly liberal
racial views, once regarded as extreme, gradually came to be accepted by a
broad swath of the amendment-writing Reconstruction Republican
Congresses.150 Speaking in support of a measure to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia, Sumner addressed the constitutional meaning of the word
"persons" within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-the very
provision whose terms eventually would be borrowed as part of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 15 1 The word "person" was a broad, inclusive one, Sumner
maintained: "[I]n the eye of the Constitution, every human being within its
sphere, whether Caucasian, Indian, or African, from the President to the slave,
is a person. Of this there can be no question."l 52 For Sumner, person was
synonymous with "every human being."
In 1864, Senator Benjamin G. Brown of Missouri expressed a similarly
broad view of the meaning of "persons," as used in the original Constitution, in
the course of the debate over a proposed thirteenth amendment to abolish
slavery.153 Brown's discussion was in the service of an argument denying that
the original Constitution's use of the phrase "all other Persons" in the Three-
Fifths Clause (concerning apportionment of representatives) implicitly
embraced the propriety of slavery. This was not so, Brown argued. "It is said
that the words 'other persons' there used included slaves," but "does the term
'person' carry with it anything further than a simple allusion to the existence of
the individual?" Brown asked.154 "It certainly cannot be strained into any
recognition of slavery, since the very recognition of personality excludes the
implied sanction of enslavement, for slavery does not regard its victims as
persons but as chattels." 55 For Brown, the term "persons" was general and not
contingent on legal status. "Does a reference to the mere fact of existence
necessarily sanction the status?" he asked, rhetorically. 156 Constitutional
personhood was a matter of existence and not legal status, Brown concluded,
and could not properly be leveraged into a constitutional sanction of slavery.157
By 1865, the anti-slavery views of men like Sumner and Brown, formerly
thought radical, had come to be embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment,
abolishing slavery.158 in December of that year, right as that amendment was
50 See CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1449 (1862).
151 Id
152 Id




I5 7 See id.
158 See Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition?: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1542-43 (2012).
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achieving its final state ratifications, radical leader Representative Thaddeus
Stevens declaimed on the rights of persons.159 They were, Stevens maintained,
"innate" and not in any way contingent on legal status, condition, or
capacities.160 "Accidental circumstances, natural and acquired endowment and
ability, will vary their fortunes," Stevens acknowledged, "[b]ut equal rights to
all the privileges of the Government" extended to "every immortal being, no
matter what the shape or color of the tabernacle which it inhabits." 161
Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, the Judiciary Committee chair and a
pivotal figure in the debates over the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,162 similarly equated "person" with "human
being," stating that "any legislation or any public sentiment which deprives any
human being in the land of those great rights of liberty will be in defiance of the
Constitution." 63
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consider the views and careful
analysis of Representative John Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment's language, concerning the meaning of the
word "person" as used initially in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause-
constitutional language echoed in part in the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees of due process and equal protection, penned by Bingham the
previous year.164
[T]he Constitution of the United States ... declared that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." By that great
law of ours it is not to be inquired whether a man is "free" by the laws of
England; it is only to be inquired is he a man, and therefore free by the law of
that creative energy which breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he
became a living soul, endowed with the rights of life and liberty. . . .Before
that great law the only question to be asked of a creature claiming its protection
15 9 See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESs. 74 (1865).
160 Id
161 Id
162 On Trumbull's significance and contributions, see Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham's Theory of Citizenship, 36
AKRON L. REv. 717, 735 (2003).
163 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESS. 77 (1865); see also id. at 22 (referring to the
"great object of securing to every human being within the jurisdiction of the Republic equal
rights before the law" during debate in the Senate Committee of the Whole on a bill to
expand the Freedmen's Bureau).
16 4 0n the importance and contributions of Bingham, see Richard L. Aynes, The
Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,
36 AKRON L. REv. 589, 590 (2003); see also AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION,
supra note 23, at 368-88; AKHML REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 171-74 (1998).
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is this: Is he a man? Every man is entitled to the protection of American law,
because its divine spirit of equality declares that all men are created equal. 165
For Bingham, the meaning of "person" posed only one question: was the
"creature" claiming the Constitution's protection a "man" (in the non-gender-
specific sense)? Simple biological humanity-divine creation as a "living
soul"-was what counted, nothing more and nothing less.
Obviously none of this is dispositive. Further, none of these statements
constitutes direct "legislative history" concerning the intended meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's text. None of these statements is even especially
probative of the question at hand: whether the term "persons," was specifically
intended to embrace the unborn. That was not the point of any of these
speakers, who had rather different issues on their minds. Even Bingham's
formulation, which comes closest to being directly on point, is not a specific
reference to abortion. Yet, it is also reasonably clear that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment drew no distinction as a factual or legal matter between
legal persons and biological human beings. Rather, the sole criterion for legal
personhood was considered to be whether someone belonged to the family of
"man"-that is, was a distinct living human being. If anything, the uncertain
evidence of original intention seems to reflect the traditional Blackstonian
understandings that the right to live is a God-given natural right166-a right (in
Thaddeus Stevens's words) "innate in every immortal being"l 67-and that this
basic right of all persons is present, in contemplation of the law, in the womb.
Every "living soul" (in John Bingham's words) in human form is "endowed
with the rights of life and liberty."1 68
It is also relevant, surely, as a matter of history and original understanding,
that so many states and territorial legislatures-thirty-six of them-had laws
prohibiting abortion in many or most circumstances at the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.169 This historical fact does not necessarily
suggest very clearly anything about the necessary meaning of the word
"persons" in the Fourteenth Amendment. The pattern of state and territorial
165 CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 542 (1867). For another, earlier statement
concerning the rights of persons, see CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., IST SESs. 65-66 (1858)
(statement of Rep. Joshua Giddings). Representative Giddings stated that "every human
being holds from the Creator an inalienable right to live," id. at 65, and that:
If this right be denied, no other can be acknowledged. If there be exceptions to this
central, this universal proposition, that all men, without respect to complexion or
condition, hold from the Creator the right to live, who shall determine what portion of
the community shall be slain? And who may perpetrate the murders?
Id. at 66.
166 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *128-30.
167 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESS. 74 (1866).
168 CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., IST SESS. 542 (1867).
169 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Paulsen,
Paulsen, J, Dissenting, supra note 10, at 209.
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legislative enactment is consistent with a personhood reading, but does not
require such a reading. It coheres with a general understanding that unborn
human fetal life is entitled to substantial state protection from private violence.
But even the personhood position does not automatically dictate any one
specific legislative approach and, moreover, state legislatures might well have
banned most abortions for general reasons of policy, without feeling required
by the Constitution to have done so.
The stronger inference is the one noted by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Roe: that it is difficult to believe that state legislatures would have understood
the Fourteenth Amendment's language as invalidating abortion prohibitions so
broadly in force in the states.170 Even that inference is not ironclad, however. It
is entirely possible for a legislature to subscribe to a rule or principle as a matter
of constitutional text on one day and the next day act, wittingly or not, in
violation of that text. 171 But again, to the degree historical evidence of intention,
understanding, or expectation is apposite, such evidence points far more
strongly in the direction of a pro-life reading of the Fourteenth Amendment than
a pro-abortion-rights reading.
V. PRECEDENT
Precedent is often a dubious source of authority.172 Yet even those who
question the authority or weight of judicial precedent in constitutional
interpretation-those who doubt, rightly, the logical validity of the proposition
that an error at time TI should be treated as authoritative at time T2 because of
the fact that error was committed at time Tl 173-will nonetheless at least
170 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171 See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, Interpretive Force, supra note *, at 1169-71 (citing
and discussing examples of actions of the First Congress that were unconstitutional).
172 See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: VOLUME 1II 1139, 1144-45 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897) ("Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not
be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of
the people and the States can be considered as well settled."). I have criticized the idea of
reliance on precedent, and the doctrine of "stare decisis," in other writing. See, e.g., Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 10, at 1551-67; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the
Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme
Court's Current Doctrine ofStare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1200-09 (2008); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
289, 292-95 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1227, 1236-37 (2008); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Precedent as Tactical
Weaponry, 86 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 56, 57-58 (2008), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-
content/uploads/Paulsen-86-TLRSA-56.pdf; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain
James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals
from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 678-81 (1995); Paulsen, The
Irrepressible Myth, supra note 72, at 2731-34.
173 That is the logical structure of an argument from precedent. See Paulsen, Abrogating
Stare Decisis, supra note 10, at 1538 n.8 ("The essence of the doctrine .. . is adherence to
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consider the reasoning of a prior judicial decision for the light it might shed on a
question of constitutional interpretation. Precedent, even if not properly vested
with a "disposition function" affording it decision-altering force in opposition to
what the interpreter otherwise would conclude, nonetheless may serve a valid
and even important "information function" of providing useful information to
such present interpreters.174 Precedent is informative even if it ought not be
dispositive. It tells us something about the results reached, and the reasoning
found persuasive, in prior cases construing a piece of constitutional language.' 75
What, then, does prior judicial interpretation have to say specifically about
the meaning of the word person as used in the Constitution's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses? What light does such prior interpretation shed on the
true meaning of the language of the text?
Obviously, there is Roe itself, and its successors. It seems to make sense to
set those decisions to one side in considering the argument from precedent, at
least for a moment. For it is the correctness of Roe's judgment on this point that
is the question under examination here. Roe's reasoning in support of its
conclusion against the legal personhood of the human fetus-its "information
function"-already has been considered at some length.176 Unless one's
doctrine of precedent holds (rather implausibly and woodenly) that the fact that
Roe decided the point itself establishes that this is the correct interpretation-a
circular proposition-then we should (mostly) look away from Roe and its
progeny. Otherwise, we are just proving a tautology: The personhood
conclusion in Roe is supported by judicial precedent because of the existence of
Roe as a precedent.177
Still, if one's theory of constitutional interpretation looks to precedent as a
source of understanding, Roe cannot be dismissed entirely. The Supreme Court
has, for forty years now, adhered to some version or another of Roe's
conclusion that abortion is a constitutional right and that the human fetus has no
constitutional rights.' 78 That is at least a relevant fact. To argue, however, that
this forty-year course of precedent actually determines constitutional meaning is
earlier decisions, in subsequent cases, simply and purely because they were once decided a
particular way, even though the court in the subsequent case otherwise would be prepared to
say, based on other interpretive criteria, that the precedent decision's interpretation of law is
wrong."); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 571 (1987) ("The bare
skeleton of an appeal to precedent is easily stated: The previous treatment of occurrence X in
manner Y constitutes, solely because of its historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in
manner Y if and when X again occurs.").
174 0n the "information" versus "disposition" functions of precedent, see Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 10, at 1545-46.
17 5 See id.
17 6 See supra pp. 39-48.
17 7 The circularity of the argument from precedent is one of many reasons I believe that
precedent is not properly constitutive of constitutional meaning, a conclusion I have
advanced at length in much of my other scholarship. See supra note 172.
178 See generally, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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surely to give precedent's "disposition function" inordinate weight. 179 It shuts
down the discussion (which is, in a sense, probably the whole point of strong
notions of stare decisis, and clearly was part of the point in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey's discussion of stare decisis). 80 If one adopts such a view, that is the
whole ballgame. Under such a conception of precedent, this factor points
decisively in the direction of rejecting legal personhood, and overwhelms any
contrary considerations of text, structure, and history, because that is what Roe
decided and because the Court has stuck with Roe.1 8'
Such a strict conception of stare decisis, however, has never been accepted
in American law and especially not in American constitutional law.182 It is
literally-and ironically-"unprecedented." Even Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, the 1992 decision reaffirming Roe, which relied to an unprecedented
degree on notions of stare decisis to reach its result that Roe should be adhered
to, "whether or not mistaken," does not go quite this far.183 (Casey concluded
that whether or not to adhere to precedent depends on a multiplicity of
indeterminate, incommensurable factors. 184 Indeed, one of the precious ironies
of Casey's discussion of precedent is that the doctrine of stare decisis, as
formulated in Casey, does not require adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis
as formulated in Casey.)185
What about before Roe? Here again-as with text, structure, and history-
the factor of precedent is simply ambiguous. There was certainly no controlling
precedent at the Supreme Court level, prior to Roe, interpreting the word person
as it concerns the unborn.186 Roe was a precedent-setting case, in this regard
179 If time and repetition by themselves established legal error as legal authority, then
Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overturning Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 542-43, 548 (1896)), was wrong, because Plessy's regime of separate-but-
equal had reigned for fifty-seven years. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337, 344 (1938); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85 (1927); McCabe v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 160 (1914). For an illustration of this point in the
form of a satire, see generally Michael Stokes Paulsen & Daniel N. Rosen, Brown, Casey-
Style: The Shocking First Draft of the Segregation Opinion, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1287 (1994)
(purporting to find an early draft opinion of Brown in which the Court adhered to Plessy on
the basis of stare decisis, in reasoning and wording closely tracking the Court's actual
opinion in Casey, reaffirming Roe).
I 80 See Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 10, at 1029-38.
181 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
182 See, e.g., id. at 854 ("[I]t is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an
'inexorable command,' and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case.").
183 Id. at 854, 857.
184 Cf id. at 854 ("[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test
the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge
the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.").
185This is the theme of Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare
Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?,
supra note 172, at 1200-09.
186 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
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and others. A Supreme Court case from two years earlier, United States v.
Vuitch, had interpreted a District of Columbia criminal statute forbidding
abortion except where necessary to preserve the mother's life or health as
placing the burden of proof on the prosecution, not the defendant, as to whether
the exception applied.187 But that was scarcely an implicit rejection of fetal
personhood; Justice Blackmun's Roe opinion cited it for such a point, but in a
way that appeared to concede that Vuitch was the weakest of weak inferential
precedents on the personhood point.' 88
What about Griswold v. Connecticut, the case most often cited as the
strongest precedent for Roe (assisted, perhaps, by other cases dealing with
sexual autonomy and marital privacy)? 189 The short answer is that, whatever the
(debatable) weight of such precedents with respect to the proposition that a
pregnant woman possesses a "liberty interest" in not being pregnant (and
likewise in not being sterilized or otherwise forbidden to conceive and bear a
child), neither Griswold nor any other case stood for the quite different
proposition that a conceived, living human embryo or fetus, gestating in his or
her mother's womb, is not legally a "person."1 90 Contraception prevents the
coming together of egg and sperm to form a new embryonic human life;
abortion kills a new human life. The two things are hugely different, and the
difference turns hugely on the existence of personhood, which is not implicated
with respect to contraception but is with respect to abortion. Griswold says
nothing about abortion. It certainly entails no holding of any kind concerning
187402 U.S. 62, 71 (1971).188 The Court in Roe cited Vuitch as "inferentially ... to the same effect" as state and
lower federal court cases rejecting fetal personhood. This was because, the Court in Roe
stated, "we there [i.e., in Vuitch] would not have indulged in statutory interpretation
favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was the
termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection." Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. But
this was hardly more than a feint. The Court in Vuitch did not in any way address
("inferentially" or otherwise) the question of whether a human fetus is a "person" within the
meaning of the Constitution. The Court was simply construing the District of Columbia
criminal statute forbidding abortion except where necessary to preserve the mother's life or
health. 402 U.S. at 70. It held that the exception language was best understood as placing the
burden of proof on the government, not the defendant, on the issue of whether an abortion
was necessary to preserve the mother's life and health-that this was an element of the
offense that the prosecution must establish. Id. at 71. Nothing in such a holding implies a
legal ruling about the constitutional status of the fetus, and no such question appears to have
been presented or addressed in Vuitch. Fetal legal personhood does not logically dictate that
there could be no exceptions to an abortion prohibition, in cases akin to traditional notions of
self-defense against serious threats to life or limb, or necessary defense of third parties. See
infra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
189381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See generally
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
190See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746-47 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (three-
judge panel).
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the personhood of unborn human fetal life. It is simply not precedent for any
proposition concerning personhood.191
What about pre-Roe lower court decisions, by state and federal courts? The
force of such precedent is obviously weaker. Moreover, the decisions
themselves were divided: Some cases, cited in Roe, indeed had rejected legal
personhood for the unborn.192 Some cases, mis-cited in Roe, did not actually
191 Professor Akhil Amar has observed that Roe is "a rather unimpressive effort" as a
doctrinal argument based on precedent:
As a precedent-follower, Roe simply stringcites a series of privacy cases involving
marriage, procreation, contraception, bedroom reading, education, and other assorted
topics, and then abruptly announces with no doctrinal analysis that its privacy right "is
broad enough to encompass" abortion. Ipse dixit. But as the Court itself admits a few
pages later, the existence of the living fetus makes the case at hand "inherently
different"-the italics here are mine-from every one of these earlier-invoked cases.
Amar, supra note 75, at 778 (footnote omitted).
192 McGarvey v. Magee- Womens Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 751, 754 (W.D. Pa. 1972), cited
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973), rejected constitutional personhood for the unborn,
as did the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Byrn v. New York City Health &
Hospitals Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 890 (N.Y. 1972). Interestingly, in light of the quasi-
legislative nature of the abortion right created in Roe, McGarvey rejected legal personhood
on the ground that recognizing such a right "would be to create a new administrative jungle
in the name of a civil right never heretofore conceived"-no pun intended, no doubt. This
was "a problem for the legislatures of the various states. They must decide the problems in
the light of the moral issues, the conflicting rights of the mother and child, the extent of
medical knowledge and the interests of the state." Any other result "would cause universal
confusion and would be a striking example of judicial legislation." McGarvey, 340 F. Supp.
at 754 (McGarvey's discussion of the impropriety of "judicial legislation," applied to the
question of the meaning of the word person, is interesting in light of the evidently legislative
nature of the abortion right created, as a matter of due process, in Roe).
Byrn upheld New York's statute liberalizing abortion as against a challenge brought on
the ground that the statute deprived the unborn of the right to life. The Court rejected
constitutional personhood, on the ground that the issue was reserved to the moral judgment
of the legislature: "The Constitution does not confer or require legal personality for the
unborn; the Legislature may, or it may do something less, as it does in limited abortion
statutes, and provide some protection far short of conferring legal personality." 286 N.E.2d
at 890.
The clearest lower court precedent deciding against constitutional personhood was the
decision of the three-judge federal district court in Abele v. Markle, a decision that the
Supreme Court vacated for reconsideration in light of Roe and Doe v. Bolton. 351 F. Supp.
224, 228 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). Abele struck down a Connecticut
law banning abortion except where necessary to safeguard the life of the mother. Id. at 232.
The court rejected the view that human fetuses are persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
Our conclusion, based on the text and history of the Constitution and on cases
interpreting it, is that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. There is nothing in the history of that amendment nor in its interpretation
by the Supreme Court to give any support whatever to the contention that a fetus has
constitutional rights.
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stand for such a position.193 And at least one prominent constitutional decision
by a three-judge federal district court, not cited in Roe, had explicitly embraced
constitutional legal personhood status for the unborn. 194 The better conclusion
from the pre-Roe lower court precedents is that the issue of legal personhood
was unsettled. Before Roe, the issue had spawned markedly contrasting judicial
conclusions.
The force of pre-Roe precedent, then-Supreme Court and lower court-on
the issue of personhood for the unborn, was simply not clear, one way or the
other. No Supreme Court decision stood for such a proposition or strongly
suggested it. And lower court decisions were conflicting. (The Roe Court's
assertion that its conclusion that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn" was "in accord with the results
Id. at 228.
193 Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Montana v.
Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 312 (1961), cited byRoe, 410 U.S. at 158, held only that persons not
"born" in the United States were not citizens of the United States by virtue of birth, within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizens Clause-and that this conclusion was
not affected by the fact that a person may have been conceived-{ but not born) in the United
States. This was not a holding concerning the meaning of "person," but one concerning the
meaning of "born." Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 623 (Cal. 1970), also cited by
Roe, 410 U.S. at 158, was an interpretation of the California murder statute, in which the
California Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not intend that the statute's
prohibition of murder of any "human being" includes an unborn but viable fetus. Keeler was
not an interpretation of the word "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, but of
California's state-law criminal murder statute.
Likewise, State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 602 (Ohio 1971), cited by Roe, 410 U.S.
at 158-59, involved a construction of an Ohio vehicular homicide statute concerning acts
causing the death of "another [person]." The Ohio court found that the death of a fetus was
not within the scope of the statute's prohibition, as a matter of state law. The case involved
no issue of interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
194See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 745 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (three-judge
panel). Steinberg upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's criminal abortion statute. Id. at 748.
Rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that the rationale of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), extended to a right to abortion, the court drew a line between contraception,
which does not destroy a human life but merely prevents its creation, and abortion, which
involves a distinct human life. Steinberg, 321 F. Supp. at 746-47. The court found that that
newly created life was entitled to constitutional protection as a person:
Thus contraception, which is dealt with in Griswold, is concerned with preventing
the creation of a new and independent life. The right and power of a man or a woman to
determine whether or not to participate in this process of creation is clearly a private
and personal one with which the law cannot and should not interfere.
It seems clear, however, that the legal conclusions in Griswold as to the rights of
individuals to determine without governmental interference whether or not to enter into
the processes of procreation cannot be extended to cover those situations wherein,
voluntarily or involuntarily, the preliminaries have ended, and a new life has begun.
Once human life has commenced, the constitutional protections found in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the state the duty of safeguarding it.
Id. at 746-47.
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reached in those few cases where that issue ha[d] been squarely presented," 195
is simply not accurate. The pre-Roe lower court decisions were divided.) As an
argument from precedent, Roe is hard-if not impossible-to defend.
Interestingly, the most relevant pre-Roe constitutional precedents construing
the word person had nothing directly to do with abortion. While there may have
been no Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution's language with
respect to living-but-not-yet-born human fetuses, there was prominent and
important Supreme Court precedent interpreting the constitutional meaning of
person in a different respect: whether the term embraced corporations as
artificial legal "persons" entitled to the constitutional protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 196 This of course was the other sense in which
Blackstone's classic formulation identified the legal term-of-art meaning of
"persons" as extending beyond born human beings. 197 It is perhaps instructive,
as a matter of the force of precedent in identifying constitutional meaning, that a
series of early Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
adopted the Blackstonian understanding of legal "persons," in this respect, as
encompassed by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.198 While legal
personhood for corporations may remain contested in certain legal circles
today,199 that is not really the point. Rather, the point is that, so far as precedent
is concerned, the earliest, most direct, and weightiest pre-Roe judicial
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's use of the word "person"
embraced the Blackstonian position. The constitutional meaning of the word
person in early judicial interpretationwas not limited to born human beings but
instead embraced a highly specific term-of-art understanding tracing back to
traditional notions of legal personhood. And, as noted earlier, the leading
195Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
196 See, e.g., Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 189 (1888).
197 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *119.
198 Pembina, 125 U.S. at 189 ("Under the designation of 'person' [in the Fourteenth
Amendment] there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are
merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose, and permitted to do business
under a particular name, and have a succession of members without dissolution."). The
earliest Supreme Court reference to corporations as legal "persons" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment appeared two years earlier, in the reporter's notes of remarks
made at argument in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said: The court does not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.
118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (syllabus).
199 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and
their 'personhood' often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves
members of 'We the People' by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.").
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authoritative legal source for such an understanding also embraced legal
personhood for living, but not yet born, human beings, as soon as their
independent human life could be identified by virtue of its detectable movement
in the mother's womb.200
Finally, when considering the force of precedent before Roe, one arguably
should take into account non-judicial precedent in the form of de facto,
functional interpretations of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment term
"person," as it concerns abortion, in statutory law. After all, constitutional
interpretation is not the exclusive province of courts. 201 It occurs, as a practical
matter, explicitly or implicitly, every time a legislature enacts a statute (though
with widely varying amounts of thoughtfulness and analytic rigor).202
Constitutional interpretation of this sort may take place in state legislatures as
well as in Congress. It is in this sense that the broad pattern of state abortion-
prohibition statutes by the states and by territorial (federal) governments at the
time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is most pertinent. 203 It is not
that the existence of abortion-prohibition state laws disproves the possibility
that the Fourteenth Amendment could have a meaning invalidating such laws.
(After all, the amendment was designed to limit state power and authorize
Congress to enforce such limitations.) Nor does the existence of abortion-
prohibition state laws establish, at least not definitively, that the word "person"
in the Fourteenth Amendment includes the unborn. But to the extent that the
enactment of abortion prohibitions could be understood as (largely sub silentio)
implicit constitutional interpretation by the states and territorial legislatures, and
to the extent that Congress's and the courts' inaction in the face of such
practical interpretation, for a hundred years, could be construed as a sub silentio
acceptance of such constructions, it surely should possess at least some slight
probative value as "precedent."
200 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 125. For a more in-depth discussion of Blackstone's
definition of legal personhood, see supra Part II.B.
201 For an extended development of this now broadly accepted general idea (with some
contestable applications), see generally Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 74.
See also Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth, supra note 72, at 2707-08. Professor David
Currie's magnificent series of books on the history of the interpretation of the Constitution
by Congress and by presidents displays this proposition in practice. See generally DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861 (2005);
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829-
1861 (2005); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-1801 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001); David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1131 (2006).
202 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 224-
37 (2002).
203 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174-75 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("By the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were at least 36 laws
enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion.").
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Put simply: the governing practical legal construction, by the states and by
instrumentalities of the national government, for a century following adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, was that unborn human life was deserving of
legal protection against destruction, except for what the legislature regarded as
compelling or important countervailing reasons.204 While the scope of such
exceptions was never perfectly consistent among the states, and the mid-
twentieth century saw increasingly liberalized abortion laws, "precedent" in the
form of legislative practice, to the extent worthy of consideration, was
consistent with a general understanding that living but unborn humans counted
as persons entitled to the protection of the law. 205
Once again, none of this is dispositive. The force, and weight, of judicial
(and non-judicial) precedent on the question of constitutional legal personhood
for the unborn is simply not clear. Roe adopted a particular conclusion and that
conclusion has governed for forty years. If that itself is reason to follow Roe's
conclusion, then precedent points against personhood. Pre-Roe lower court
decisions were divided, reaching differing conclusions. And early pre-Roe
Supreme Court precedent, on a different specific question (corporate
personhood) had embraced a broader, term-of-art legal meaning of persons
under the Fourteenth Amendment, pointing uncertainly but presumptively in the
direction of legal personhood for the unborn (and tending to reinforce the
textual argument that the original public meaning of the constitutional term
persons embraced the unborn, per the Blackstonian view). 206 Precedent, a
highly debatable source of constitutional interpretive authority in the first place,
is of highly debatable relevance as applied to the specific question of whether
the word "persons" may include unborn but living human beings present in their
mothers' wombs. 207
204 See id at 174-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205 Id
206 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
207 What about post-Roe judicial precedent in state and federal courts addressing the
legal status of the unborn as distinct legal persons, in non-abortion contexts (like state
wrongful death and homicide statutes)? Such precedent is of secondary importance, to the
extent it is not direct interpretation of the meaning of the word "person" in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, but nonetheless might validly be thought relevant to the extent it
tends to undermine the authoritative status or consistency of the Court's conclusion in Roe:
under the Supreme Court's formulation of the doctrine of stare decisis in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the force of a
precedent is weakened to the extent it has been undermined by other decisions, so that it
might be thought a "remnant" or derelict of generally abandoned doctrines. See id. at 854-
55; Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 10, at 1557-61; Paulsen, Does the
Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme
Court's Current Doctrine ofStare Decisis?, supra note 172, at 1203-05.
For a sampling of such post-Roe, non-abortion state and federal judicial precedent
(tending more in the direction of recognizing the living human fetus as a separate,
independent person) and for lucid summaries and analyses of such cases, see Clarke D.
Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal
Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 563, 616-19 (1987). See generally Paul Benjamin Linton,
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VI. POLICY, PRAGMATICS, EVOLVING MEANING, AND THE PROGRESS OF
SCIENCE
The last criterion of constitutional meaning-last and, for good reason,
least-is whether, independently of original textual meaning; logical inferences
from constitutional structure or analogy; subjective historical intention,
understanding, or expectation; or longstanding practice and clear judicial
precedent, considerations of policy, science, or society's evolving views of what
is just, right, and true dictate that a constitutional provision ought to be
interpreted (or re-interpreted) to mean a particular thing or to dictate particular
conclusions. This cluster of criteria is controversial precisely because it does not
involve interpretation of the constitutional text so much as explicitly normative
reimagining and refashioning of that text: What should the text be taken or
made by interpreters to mean, so that it is in some relevant sense a "better" text
than its words, structure, and history otherwise would suggest?
This of course was the approach of Roe v. Wade itself: Roe's result had
essentially nothing to do with the text, structure, or history of the Constitution
and only the most tenuous of connections to prior judicial precedent, from
which the Court in Roe extrapolated freely and loosely.208 No rule or principle
supplied by a fair reading of the text; no rule fairly derived from the
Constitution's internal structure, logic, or other clear propositions within the
document; and no rule fairly attributable to the Framers' or ratifiers' intentions,
expectations, or even general purposes, remotely supports Roe's result. No
precedent decision compelled or even very strongly supported the outcome in
Roe.
Roe was primarily if not entirely a decision of judicially devised abortion
policy. The justices created an abortion right not because the Constitution's text
provides one but because it seemed to the justices an appropriate thing to do as
a matter of policy.
That policy decision is contestable, as all policy decisions are. That is part
of what makes such pure policy arguments so dubious as a device for
constitutional interpretation. In a representative democracy, policy choices
typically are to be made by representative institutions; courts have authority to
set aside such choices only when contrary to rules of law constraining such
choices. As I have argued elsewhere, Roe's policy is horrible. The decision
essentially creates "a plenary right of some human beings to kill other human
beings for any reason or for no reason at all."209 To the extent Roe reached the
result it did because the Court felt that it was doing justice, it can fairly be
argued that what Roe did was the exact opposite of justice-indeed, that Roe is
The Legal Status of the Unborn Child Under State Law, 6 ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
141 (2011).
208 See Paulsen, Paulsen, J, Dissenting, supra note 10, at 197-208 (canvassing these
arguments with respect to the issue of whether the Constitution creates an abortion right).2091d. at 197.
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one of the most atrociously unjust decisions in the Supreme Court's history. 210
My substantive-justice policy position is no more falsifiable than the Roe
Court's, on constitutional criteria, because there are few or no such criteria for
evaluating policy arguments as being more or less correct as a matter of
constitutional interpretation. Policy arguments can be merely so many
collections of personal preferences.
But let us indulge the assumption that policy-based constitutional
arguments are legitimate and play the game, for the sake of argument. Let us
consider substantive-justice policy arguments specifically with respect to how
present-day interpreters should understand the word "persons." Should the term
be construed to include the unborn? As with all policy-driven constitutional
arguments, it is always possible to make arguments on either side and almost
impossible to evaluate the merit of such arguments in terms of neutral, external
criteria supplied by the Constitution. Still, there are at least some plausible,
contemporary social-policy arguments that might be thought properly to inform
the meaning of the term "persons" and that do so in a way less susceptible than
other such policy arguments to the charge of simple personal preference.
First, a fairly compelling "evolving-meaning" policy argument for a broad
understanding of person as including the unborn (even if such a reading would
not otherwise be thought warranted by consideration of text, structure, history,
and precedent) can be erected on the platform that the state of our scientific and
medical knowledge is simply far more advanced than it was at the time the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted. As a result of advances in
embryology and medical knowledge generally, as well as in technological
means for observation and evaluation of the embryo and fetus at far earlier
stages than was possible in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we now
know-far more certainly and clearly than ever before-that a new, distinct
human life comes into existence at the moment of conception. 211 We know, if
we did not know before, that the being gestating in the mother's womb, is the
same biological living human organism-the same human being-as he or she
will be after birth. There is no ontological transformation that occurs at the
point of birth, or at some mid-point in pregnancy (such as the medieval or
Enlightenment theological or practical line of "quickening"), or at any other
point subsequent to conception. The man or woman, or boy or girl, who is a
living-breathing-walking-talking "person" today is the same ontological
being-the same person-as he or she was in the womb, beginning at the point
of conception. He or she may have different capacities now, have had more and
different life experiences, and possess some different physical, mental, and
emotional attributes than he or she had as a zygote, embryo, fetus, newborn,
toddler, or teenager. (One expects and hopes so.) But he or she is the same
210Id. at 211-13; see also Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 10, at
1001.
211 For a powerful, readable, concise, straightforward philosophical defense of this
(medically obvious) proposition, see Mathew Lu, Potentiality Rightly Understood, PUB.
DISCOURSE (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/11/6236.
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human being as he or she was at each of those earlier stages in the human life
cycle. He or she is the same organism, the same person, as he or she was at each
of those stages of development. 212
We know this to be true as a matter of basic scientific fact. Biologically
speaking, the human embryo or fetus is not "potential" human life. It is an
actual, distinct, extant individual human life. He or she (for it is also an
incontrovertible fact that the fetus has a sex from conception) 213 has potential
for further growth, change, and development, obviously. But the life in question
is the same human life throughout. To claim that the unborn human embryo is
not existing human life is, as I have put it before, "from a scientific and medical
standpoint, simply absurd. No serious physician or biologist would hold such a
view. To so claim is either an act of ignorance or one of willful intellectual
dishonesty." 214
We did not always know this.215 At the very least, the scientific evidence
was not always so clear as to the point at which a human life begins. In
addition, our technological capabilities have grown, so that we now have the
ability to see-to detect and observe-new human life at points when such life
could not have been detected, let alone observed, in earlier centuries. As noted
earlier, this past deficiency explains in part Blackstone's eighteenth-century
observation that the law recognizes the existence of a new, distinct person when
the fetus is "able to stir" in the mother's womb. 216 Before that point, the fetus
could not in the eighteenth century be perceived as living.217
2 12 Id. ("I began my existence as a zygote. I am just as much the same thing as that
zygote as I am the same thing as my one-year-old self. This is important because the ground
of my identity with my one-year-old self cannot be either material or psychological. I do not
share the same matter as that child, nor do I share any memories or experiences with him.
And yet surely I am the same human being, the same organism, the same substance, the
same person.").
213 See, e.g., KRISTINE BARLOW-STEWART, CTR. FOR GENETICS EDUC., FACT SHEET 1,
GENES AND CHROMOSOMES: THE GENOME 3 (2012), available at
http://www.genetics.edu.au/Information/Genetics-Fact-Sheets/Genes-and-Chromosomes-
FS 1.
2 14 Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 10, at 1017; see also Paulsen,
Accusing Justice, supra note 10, at 47-48.
215 The Roe opinion noted that "[t]here has always been strong support for the view that
life does not begin until live birth." 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). The Roe opinion attributed
this view to the ancient Stoics, and purported to find it also in Jewish and medieval Christian
thought. Id. Even if this were an accurate description of ancient beliefs, such beliefs
obviously should have no relevance unless they formed part of the enacted legal meaning of
the word "persons" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent the Court in Roe
drew upon such observations to inform its policy judgment with respect to personhood, that
judgment was simply factually wrong and should be discarded in light of actual medical
knowledge. If the Stoics believed that life does not begin until live birth, they were mistaken
as a matter of fact.2 16 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at * 125.2 17 As suggested earlier, Blackstone does not say that the unborn child is not actually a
living, separate human being before he or she is able to stir in the womb. See supra notes
2013] 63
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries we have no such technological
difficulties and much more certain medical knowledge. Thus, even if the unborn
child were not regarded as a legal "person" at the time of the original
Constitution or at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that view
should be revised in light of our superior state of knowledge today. If the old
legal view was predicated on factual assumptions we now know to be mistaken,
the meaning of "person" should be updated to reflect current knowledge. 218
At all events, it seems especially absurd in light of scientific knowledge to
draw the personhood line at birth. Live birth is certainly an important event in a
human being's life cycle. It is an important marker and convenient dividing line
for many purposes. But as far as human personhood is concerned, birth is an
arbitrary point. Birth changes a human being's location, not his existence as a
human being. Legally, birth triggers certain rights that before birth did not exist
(like citizenship) and starts the legal clock running for others (like presidential
eligibility). 219 But birth clearly does not change being in a sense that affects
whether the being in question is a distinctive human person or not. Birth does
not change a non-human organism into a human organism. 220 It is equally
arbitrary and nonsensical to treat birth as changing a non-person into a person.
A second reasonable evolving-meaning policy argument for interpreting
"person" broadly to include the unborn is simply the liberal policy generally
favoring broad, inclusive understandings of the scope of human rights and the
persons to whom they extend. Simply stated: As between a narrower
construction of "persons" that defines certain living human beings as non-
persons, outside the protections of the law, and a broader construction that
resolves uncertainties or potentially difficult line-drawing questions in favor of
greater coverage, the latter is to be preferred. Human societies have had a good
deal of experience with definitional exclusion of "the other" as unworthy of
equal treatment as a fellow human being possessed of equal dignity and moral
worth. Examples range from extreme tribalism to slavery, to the treatment of
women at certain times and in certain cultures, to the eugenics movement, to
37-55. Rather, Blackstone can be read as saying only that demonstrated ability to stir in the
womb establishes that such an actual separate living human being is present in the womb, so
that the law confidently can recognize the existence of another individual person. Ability to
stir functions as something of a "safe harbor" for legal personhood: such ability
demonstrates that a person exists. The absence of such an ability does not demonstrate that a
person does not exist.
218 Indeed, as noted above, it is not even necessary to cast this argument as one for
changing the meaning of the word person from its original understanding. One can as readily
view the argument as one merely for recognizing that the unborn human embryo or fetus
always did fit within the category of legal "persons" but, because of limited knowledge and
technology, this fact was not known at the time. See supra pp. 27-29.
2 19 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("[N]either shall any Person be eligible to [the
office of President] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All
persons born . .. in the United States . .. are citizens of the United States . . .
220 See Lu, supra note 211.
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Nazism. None of this experience has been good. Blacks, women, Asians, Jews,
the mentally or physically disabled, and gays have all, at times, arbitrarily been
excluded from the full rights of persons.221 With good reason, then, we should
be wary of any policy argument that takes a category of apparent human beings
and defines them to be non-persons-legal non-entities. At the very least, any
such categorical exclusion surely should be subjected to "strict scrutiny" (a
familiar legal construct) and require extraordinary justification in order to be
sustained. There should thus be, as a matter of sound constitutional policy, a
strong presumption in favor of personhood and a commensurately heavy
resistance to less-than-compelling arguments against a class of seeming persons
being counted as, legally, "persons." 222
Roe adopted the reverse presumption. The Court, in a move notorious to its
detractors and embarrassing even to its defenders, stated that it did not need to
"resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." 223 Yet just a page
earlier it had rejected the proposition that the unborn counted as persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment: "All this .. . persuades us that the word 'person,'
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." 224
There are some rather obvious problems with this juxtaposition of non-
conclusion and conclusion: First, if a new human life did exist from the point of
221 For a sampling of notorious judicial examples of explicit or implicit denial of full
personhood status in law, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding
constitutionality of racial segregation); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407
(1856) (describing Africans as "beings of inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race" and "so far inferior" as to possess "no rights which the white man [is]
bound to respect," attributing such a view to the framing generation, and holding that
persons of the African race cannot be citizens of the United States). See also Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese-American U.S.
citizens on the basis of their Japanese ethnic heritage); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (finding that state law authorizing sterilization of the mentally impaired, because of
their disability, does not deny equal protection of the laws, on ground that "[tihree
generations of imbeciles are enough"); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872)
(upholding a state supreme court decision excluding a woman from the practice of law
because of her sex); Robert A. Destro, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia
After 30 Years Introduction, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1207, 1221 n.42 (1998) (discussing how,
"[l]ike their Nazi counterparts, American eugenics advocates branded minorities and persons
with developmental disabilities as genetically undesirable, 'socially inadequate and a
constant menace to the white race and society at large"' (quoting Barbara L. Bemier, Class,
Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Socio-Political Choices, 11 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L. J. 115, 130 (1994))).
222 Cf United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). If ever
there were a category for inclusion and protection as a discrete and insular minority class,
lacking effective access to the political process for protection of rights, it is the unborn.223 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
224Id. at 158.
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conception-the point on which the Court said it was so deeply uncertain-then
the preceding conclusion that "the word 'person' . . . does not include the
unborn" becomes deeply problematic. In such event, the Court would be saying
that a human life exists that is not a person. That would be incoherent-so
much so, in fact, that purported agnosticism about the factual question of when
human life begins cannot tolerably coexist with the conclusion that unborn are
not persons. That leads to the second problem: agnosticism about life's
beginnings should lead to uncertainty about legal personhood for the unborn,
not rejection of such a proposition. Roe's life's-beginning-point-is-uncertain-
but-the-unborn-are-certainly-not-persons stance is not logical. Third, as
discussed, as a bare matter of policy, agnosticism or uncertainty should yield a
presumption of inclusion, not exclusion, from the category of human
personhood. Just as uncertainty about whether a person is dead should produce
caution with respect to burial, uncertainty about whether a living human being
is a person should yield caution with respect to killing. The error costs of
mistaken exclusion are simply enormous. And finally, as noted above, the
question of when human life begins is simply not "difficult" at all. It is a matter
of rudimentary scientific knowledge that human life begins at conception. 225 A
new human being, a biologically distinct individual, exists from that point
forward. As a matter of policy, then, the factual premises, the presumptions, and
the reasoning of Roe concerning personhood are all wrong.
The best policy argument against interpreting "person" to include the
unborn is that doing so would have the consequence of imposing burdens on
pregnant women-and, in a fairly-designed social system, men too-that that
they otherwise might avoid by abortion. Clearly, recognition of unborn children
as persons possessing constitutional rights to life and equal protection would
severely limit the circumstances in which the law could tolerate the killing of
such children. And clearly, pregnancy, childbirth, and parental responsibilities
can be genuine burdens on those who otherwise would not have to bear such
burdens. But this policy consideration does not bear very persuasively on how
we should construe "person"-if inconvenience to or burden on another was
sufficient to make someone not a person we would all be in trouble-but goes
more to how the competing interests of different persons should be balanced in
the abortion policy calculus. Some asserted harms created by pregnancy,
childbirth, and parenthood should perhaps prevail and justify the regrettable
killing the unborn child, even if recognized as being a person. (Even the most
committed pro-life champions accept this proposition, at least for certain
circumstances.) 226 And some such asserted harms certainly should not prevail
225 Lu, supra note 211.
226 Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 10, at 1020 ("Even granting the
status of the human fetus as human life, entitled to moral regard as such, there are doubtles
'hard cases' where one might think that the value of giving full regard to human life must
yield to another value. Traditionally, private violence against the life of another sometimes
may be justified, or excused, when such violence is necessary to save one's own life or the
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over the unborn child's constitutional rights, as a person, to live and to receive
the protection of law. (Even some defenders of the pro-abortion-freedom
position concede as much.)227 But it seems mistaken, and a bit extreme, to say
that a desire to strike the policy balance entirely in the direction of abortion
freedom warrants reaching a negative conclusion concerning whether the
unborn are "persons" in the first place.
What about the unfairness of the relative burdens that human biology (in
part) and human society and law (in part) place on women and men with respect
to pregnancy, childbirth, and parental responsibilities? Again, these important
social policy considerations seem to be collateral to the question of legal
personhood for the unborn. One could conclude that the unborn are persons and
still address these questions of unequal burdens through social policy. And one
could conclude that the unborn are not persons and yet find that the unequal
biological and social-construct burdens on women and men, resulting from
pregnancy, would largely remain.228 The relative burdens on women and men
can, and should, be made more equal, but this social-policy goal exists whether
the fetus is a person or not. A dispute about unequal treatment of A, relative to
B, resulting from A's more demanding duties with respect to C, should be
remedied by adjusting the unequal treatment of A relative to B, not by declaring
C to be a non-person to whom neither A nor B should owe any duty whatever.
Policy considerations, then, to the extent relevant to constitutional
interpretation, and notions of "living constitutionalism" under which the
meaning of constitutional provisions may be understood to evolve and grow
over time, tend on balance to support reading the word "person" to include the
unborn. Scientific knowledge has advanced to the point that it is now
recognized as basic biological fact that a new human life, and a distinctive
individual human identity, exists from the point of conception-information
that points strongly in the direction of personhood. Modern recognition of the
life of an innocent third party. Thus, many pro-life advocates concede that abortion is
morally justifiable (or excusable) where necessary to save the life of the child's mother.").
227 Polling data consistently show that many who consider themselves "pro-choice" on
abortion in fact favor restrictions of many kinds on abortion, and oppose numerous reasons
for which abortion legally may be obtained under Roe. See Steven Ertelt, Gallup Finds
"Pro-Choice" Americans Back Most Abortion Limits, LIFENEWS.COM (Aug. 8, 2011, 6:08
PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/08/08/gallup-finds-pro-choice-americans-back-most-
abortion-limits/.
22 8 See generally Richard Stith, Her Choice, Her Problem: How Abortion Empowers
Men, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 2009, at 7, available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/07/her-choice-her-problem. See also Paulsen,
Paulsen, J, Dissenting, supra note 10, at 216-17 n.9 ("If one is concerned about the special
burdens of pregnancy and motherhood, the remedy is better social and political
accommodation of pregnancy and motherhood.... Pregnancy, childbirth, and parenthood
impose unique burdens and special obligations. The proper response of society is reasonable
accommodation of those who bear these burdens and assume these obligations so that they
may be fully equal citizens and participants in the life of the nation, not to create a legal right
to eliminate pregnancy by exterminating an unborn child.").
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imperative of universal human rights, and of the dangers of definitional
exclusion from the human community of persons, points strongly toward a
presumption in favor of a broader, more inclusive understanding of who fits
within the category of legal persons. And policy arguments from autonomy,
freedom, avoidance of the burdens of pregnancy, childbirth and parenthood, and
equality, whatever their weight and merit, are essentially collateral to issues of
the personhood of the unborn. They are mostly relevant at the point of
consideration how to balance, or adjust, the conflicting rights or interests of
different persons.
VII. CONCLUSION
Where are we, then, in the end? Text, structure, history, precedent, and
policy do not point to an absolutely clear, unambiguous, indisputable answer to
the question of whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections of
the rights of persons extend to the unborn. But they do, on balance, suggest the
plausibility of such legal personhood. Indeed, if forced to choose between the
alternatives, the weight of the evidence and reasoning far more strongly
supports the personhood position than rejects it.
The text itself may fairly be said to be indeterminate, or under-determinate,
on this point. But not by very much: Evidence of original public meaning in
historical and legal context-notably, the backdrop legal understanding of
"person" in conventional legal discourse at the time, set forth in Blackstone and
carried forward in the American understanding-leans strongly in the direction
of resolving any surface ambiguity in the direction of legal personhood for the
unborn at some point during pregnancy and most definitely by the point when
the child is "able to stir" in the womb. 229 Intratextual comparisons with usage of
"person" in other constitutional provisions yield uncertain conclusions because
the comparisons frequently are not precisely analogous. 23 0 And where they are,
they still suggest that the conclusion could run in either direction. At the same
time, first principles of constitutional structure and democratic governance are
quite strongly suggestive of an interpretive "default rule" for such cases of
linguistic ambiguity and uncertainty: that democratic representative choices
may not properly be invalidated by courts as contrary to a rule of law supplied
by the Constitution where the choice fairly lies within the range of meaning
admitted by an indeterminate or under-determinate text. 231 If the meaning of the
word person fairly may include the unborn-if such a construction lies within
the range of meaning afforded by ambiguity or uncertainty-state legislatures,
and Congress, can act legislatively on such an interpretation.
22 9 See supra Part II.2 30 See supra Part III.A.
231 See supra Part III.B.
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Historical evidence of "original intent" is unclear on the point, largely
because abortion was not at all the focus of the discussion. 232 The term person
appears to have been used synonymously with the category of "human beings,"
generally, and the framers of this constitutional language can fairly be deemed
to have contemplated a broad, inclusive understanding of the term. There is no
evidence to the contrary on this point. Again, this does not yield up a definite
conclusion with respect to whether the unborn were subjectively intended to be
protected as constitutional persons. But the principle is reasonably clear: all
living, individual members of the human race were intended to be protected, as
persons, in certain core human rights, including the right to life and to the equal
protection of the laws.
Judicial precedent and doctrine is decisively against reading "person" to
include the unborn, if Roe and its progeny are counted-but that of course is the
very question under consideration: whether Roe and its progeny are correct on
this question. Reliance on Roe in this sense seems somewhat circular. Judicial
precedent and doctrine, considered apart from the Roe line, point to no certain
or definite conclusion. Pre-Roe lower court decisions were divided.
Longstanding Supreme Court precedent recognizing the legal "personhood" of
corporate entities leans slightly in the direction of the traditional Blackstonian
conception of legal personhood, which, as noted, recognized legal personhood
for the unborn to a significant extent. If pre-Roe practice, in the form of state
and federal statutes, counts in the precedent category, there is another slight
push in the direction of personhood-at the very least stronger than the force of
legislative precedent in the opposite direction. 233
Policy considerations can be taken in practically any direction and are
therefore rightly regarded as suspect. Nonetheless, an evolving-meaning,
changed-information policy argument can fairly be made for reading "persons"
broadly, in accordance with advances in scientific knowledge establishing
beyond doubt that an individual human life begins at conception and continues
through various stages of development, and also in accordance with a
presumption favoring broad inclusion, rather than selective exclusion, of
members of the human family from the definition of legal "persons." 234
In sum, the legal personhood of the unborn is an entirely plausible
interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution. It is perhaps not an interpretation compelled by the document, but
surely it is not (as Roe held, in effect) an interpretation foreclosed by the
document. Personhood for the unborn, and attendant constitutional rights to life
and protection for such persons, falls within the range of meaning admitted by
the language of the Constitution.
The plausibility of personhood only gets you so far. That the word
"person," as used in the Constitution in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
232 See supra Part IV.
233 See supra Part V.
234See supra Part VI.
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is broad enough to embrace living but unborn humans does not itself say
anything specific about what the precise legal regime must be with respect to
abortion. Blackstone, for example, observed that in legal contemplation human
life, and consequently the rights of persons as persons, begins when an infant is
"able to stir."235 But Blackstone also noted the different ways the law acted
upon this premise-the implication being that, while legal personhood
obviously has consequences for what the legal regime ought to be, it might not
itself determine that regime in all particulars. 236 There is reasoning that remains
to be done, even if the personhood of the unborn is accepted as the starting
point for that reasoning.
Thus, the fact that the unborn might properly be considered constitutional
persons within the American legal order, vested with rights to life and to
protection of the state's laws from harm committed by others, does not get one
all the way to resolving questions of how to reconcile those rights with possibly
conflicting rights or legal interests possessed by others. Justice Blackmun's Roe
opinion stated that "[i]f this suggestion of personhood is established," the case
for recognizing a plenary Fourteenth Amendment right to abortion "collapses,
for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment." 237 This of course is partly right: a constitutional right to life, and
to the protection of law, is surely inconsistent with a plenary legal right of
others to take that life. But it is only partly right: the right to life of unborn
persons does not necessarily mean that such a right must supersede any and all
competing rights of other persons in every circumstance. Clearly, for example,
the pregnant woman has a right to life too. What happens when two rights to
life, held by two different persons, conflict with one another is something that
the proposition of personhood for the unborn does not settle all on its own.
Justice Blackmun was obviously wrong in thinking that the proposition of
personhood, because it suggests that a claimed general right to abortion could
not be recognized, must be incorrect because that would then mean that abortion
would be impermissible even to save the mother's life-that any exceptions
automatically would be unconstitutional. 238 Such a proposition is utterly
illogical.239
235 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *129.236 Id at *125-26.
237 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973).
238 See id. at 157-58 n.54.
239Consider Professor Akhil Amar's devastating, quick critique of Blackmun's
reasoning on this score:
In a footnote Justice Blackmun suggests that if a fetus is indeed a Fourteenth
Amendment "person," a state could probably not allow abortion even to save the life of
the mother. Would not such a pro-mother rule "appear to be out of line with the
[Fourteenth] Amendment's command?" he asks. The only thing out of line here, I
suggest, is Justice Blackmun's convoluted logic.... Where a mother's life is at stake,
what exactly in the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent the state from allowing her to
save herself, even at the expense of the "person" she is carrying inside her?
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Rather, what personhood probably would mean is that certain less-weighty
competing interests of other persons would have to yield to the unborn child's
right to live and that the state's judgments in this regard would be subject to
some range of choice but also to meaningful scrutiny. Personhood would also
mean that a legal regime permitting abortion in certain exceptional
circumstances could not do so in a fashion that permitted unborn persons' lives
to be taken without due process of law or that denied the unborn equal
protection of the laws. Such persons would be constitutionally entitled to (1)
process appropriate to the life-and-death stakes involved; and (2) protection
equal to that afforded other persons in comparable situations. Working out the
details of what process is due, and what protection is equal, involves a further
reasoning process with some room for disagreement as to specifics. It might
well follow, for example, that the mandate of due process requires a hearing at
which someone is permitted to represent and advocate for the interest of the
unborn child in living; and that equal protection might forbid allowing the
human fetus to be killed for reasons substantially less weighty that those
recognized by the law as allowing other killings for reasons of self-defense or to
save the gravely endangered life of another.240
Finally, it must be repeated and remembered that the plausibility of
personhood, as an interpretation allowed by the fair range of meaning of the
word "person" in legal usage, does not necessarily mean that such a reading is
therefore required. That would be to commit an equal and opposite error to
Roe's, which was to treat indeterminacy and uncertainty as yielding a
conclusion that personhood was therefore forbidden. Rather, the plausibility,
but uncertainty, of legal personhood for the unborn probably means that the text
Amar, supra note 75, at 777 (footnote omitted).
240 In an essay ten years ago, as part of a book of mock alternative opinions to Roe
edited by Jack M. Balkin, I replied to the argument of "Chief Justice Balkin" that
personhood was inconsistent with permitting abortion to save the life of the mother, unless
the unborn child's rights were represented by counsel or a guardian ad litem. See generally
Paulsen, Paulsen, 1, Dissenting, supra note 10, at 196-218. Balkin, much like Blackmun,
seemed to regard the notion as a reductio ad absurdum disproving the personhood
suggestion. "Justice Paulsen" retorted:
But there is nothing at all absurd about this inadvertently insightful suggestion. It is
simply unfamiliar in the abortion context. In an appropriate case in which a state
permitted aborting the child to save the mother but failed to provide procedural
safeguards to ensure equal protection of the child's life, it would certainly be open to
this Court to consider whether the requirement of equal protection of the laws was not
satisfied (assuming it having first been decided that the unborn child was a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). Similarly, the Chief Justice seems
to think it a refutation of any claim that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the legal
personhood of unborn human fetuses that this might mean that some state laws are too
permissive in the circumstances in which abortion is allowed. Indeed it might, but this is
not a refutation of the Equal Protection personhood contention, if otherwise valid, but
an implication of it.
Id. at 218 n.14.
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does not yield a judicial rule, in opposition to democratic choices, at all. The
Supreme Court would not be justified in creating a full-blown right-to-life
quasi-statute, in opposition to democratic choices, any more than it would be
justified in creating a full-blown right-to-abortion quasi-statute, in opposition to
democratic choices (as it wrongfully did in Roe). If "person" is, constitutionally,
indeterminate or under-determinate as it respects the unborn such that either
view falls fairly within the range of meaning of the imperfectly determinate
text, then the constitutionally correct default rule is that the courts may not
invalidate state legislative choices in this regard and that Congress may,
pursuant to its powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
supersede such choices by its constitutional interpretive judgment within the
sphere of its broad legislative power.
It is at least possible, given the weight of the interpretive evidence, to state
the conclusion more strongly yet: the personhood interpretation is not merely
plausible but, on balance, persuasive-and certainly far more so than the
interpretive alternative. One might fairly conclude that the meaning of "person"
in the Fourteenth Amendment, as it concerns conceived-but-unborn human life,
is not really "indeterminate" at all, but sufficiently determinate (even if not
absolutely so) to permit a determinate conclusion in favor of legal personhood.
Whether one judges this to be the case or not may turn, in the end, on
differences in views (or subjective perceptions) concerning the strength, or
evidentiary weight, necessary to move one from a position of uncertainty or
indeterminacy to a position of confidence and definite repose.
At all events, the clear plausibility of personhood suggests at the very least
that Roe-on this point as on so many others-is indefensible. Uncertainty,
indeterminacy, or unclarity of the constitutional text on the point in question
cannot logically yield a conclusion that the Constitution rejects personhood. If
legal personhood for the unborn falls within the range of meaning of the
constitutional text-if the Constitution does not supply a reasonably clear
answer rejecting such a position as forbidden by text, structure, history,
precedent, and policy-then there is no proper basis for the courts to invalidate
a legislative choice predicated on such a view. The plausibility of personhood
thus establishes the proper starting point for all further constitutional analysis of
the abortion issue. It establishes that the first error of Roe was in its first
premise that the Constitution's term "persons" necessarily excludes the unborn.
The myriad other errors that followed were only made possible by that first
unwarranted step.
The plausibility of personhood tends to establish one final point. If the
conclusion that the unborn are persons is, in the end, regarded as too uncertain a
reading of the text-too much of an inference, too much of an extrapolation, too
great an extension or penumbra, too weakly supported by the text, structure,
logic, history, and precedent-how much more so is it not the case that such
interpretive methodological reservations apply to an even greater degree to the
position actually adopted in Roe-that there exists a constitutional right to
abortion? Surely, if constitutional interpretive premises and methods are
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applied consistently, one cannot fairly conclude that legal personhood for the
unborn is inconceivable (so to speak) yet continue to insist that substantive due
process, or some other creative argument for abortion rights, creates an
affirmative constitutional right to abortion. If sauce for the goose forbids
recognition of a constitutional right to life, sauce for the gander all the more
clearly forbids recognition of a constitutional right to abortion. Or to put it more
pointedly: If personhood is not a plausible construction of the Constitution, a
right to abortion is a truly ridiculous one.

